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Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act
and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941t
Karl E. Klare*
The legal system is, fundamentally, a normative instance of history.
It defines goals, decides what roads society must travel, and dictates
the norms of social action. The legal system, therefore, has within
its essence a profound political content; it is not a flower which
blossoms in the desert. Law always expresses a vision of society. It
also expresses the groups behind this vision and the interests served
by conceiving the society in that particular form.
-From a speech by Jos6 Antonio Viera-Gallo*
I. THE PROBLEM
When passed, the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act' was
perhaps the most radical piece of legislation ever enacted by the
United States Congress. 2 Enacted in the wake of the great strikes of
1934, at an unusually tense and fluid historical moment, it repre-
sented, in the words of one historian, "an almost unbelievable capitu-
t Copyright 1978 by Karl E. Klare.
* Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
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Katherine Stone, and Roberto Unger, and also to my parents, Charles and the late
Mildred Klare, for helping me to understand what the labor upsurge of the 1930's and
1940's meant in human terms. Thanks are also due to the late Bernard Dunau for
encouraging my historical research on labor law notwithstanding his skepticism of my
premises. He died shortly before I completed the first draft; his passing was a grievous
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1. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970)).
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was substantially amended by the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970)), and by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
2. See text accompanying notes 62-79 infra.
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lation by the government." 3 It appears that a small number of the
most sophisticated representatives of business favored passage of the
Act on the theory that some such measure was essential to preserve
the social order and to forestall developments toward even more radi-
cal change.' Nonetheless, most employers, large and small, bitterly
opposed passage of the Act, 5 and its enactment touched off several
years of fierce and concerted resistance to labor and law throughout
the ranks of American business.' This massive employer resistance
was met by one of the most dramatic strike waves in the annals of
labor, culminating in the "sit-down" movement and the rise of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).
It is of transcendent importance in understanding what follows
to appreciate that the Wagner Act did not fully become "the law"
when Congress passed it in 1935, or even when the Supreme Court
ruled it constitutional in 1937, although obviously these legal events
enhanced the legitimacy of the labor movement. The Act "became
law" only when employers were forced to obey its command by the
imaginative, courageous, and concerted efforts of countless unher-
alded workers.7 This was one of the rare instances in which the com-
mon people, often heedless of the advice of their own leaders, seized
control of their destinies and genuinely altered the course of Ameri-
can history.
The Wagner Act and the rise of organized labor unquestionably
effected profound changes in the American political economy. Collec-
tive bargaining became fairly widespread, unions attained a signifi-
cant role in the partisan political system, the labor market was ra-
tionalized in certain important ways, many people improved their
standard of living and job security, and millions of workers experi-
enced a new sense of participation and dignity.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of labor's New Deal, many em-
ployers feared that the Act would lead to state control of business and
3. P. CONKIN, FDR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WELFARE STATE 63 (1967).
4. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVF BARGAINING POLICY 100-
06 (1950); G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES 233-49 (1970).
5. See notes 62-66 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 67-76 infra and accompanying text.
7. The two most crucial early breakthroughs in collective bargaining, which laid
a political foundation for more widespread employer acceptance of and obedience to
the Wagner Act, were probably General Motors' agreement with the United Auto
Workers and United States Steel's about-face decision to deal with the Steel Workers
Organizing Committee. Both events occurred before the April 12, 1937, decision of the
Supreme Court upholding the Act, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), but after the sit-down strike wave had begun; in particular, both occurred
against the backdrop of the momentous Flint sit-down strike against General Motors
in the winter of 1936-1937 and are directly traceable to that strike and its surrounding
events and circumstances. See I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 457-73, 519-51 (1970).
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compulsory arbitration of the terms and conditions of employment,
if not a usurpation of the prerogatives of private property ownership
itself. These fears proved to be exaggerated, however, for whatever its
achievements, the Act did not produce a fundamental transformation
of the premises and institutions of capitalist society. True, private
ownership was burdened by state regulation that allowed most work-
ers the right to organize and bargain collectively. But state regulation
is characteristic of advanced capitalism;' rather than radically revis-
ing property relations or the social distribution of power, it protects
them. Likewise, although workers in unionized industries generally
enjoy a higher standard of living and more security now than did most
workers a generation ago, the Act did little to enhance their decision-
making role regarding the use of society's means of production, the
organization of the work-process, and other decisions that affect their
industrial lives. Moreover, New Deal reform appears to have fostered
the co-optation of the workers' movement and, with the exception of
certain periods such as the post-World War IH strike wave, a diminu-
tion of labor's combativeness. Indeed, it has been argued that collec-
tive bargaining has become an institutional structure not for express-
ing workers' needs and aspirations but for controlling and disciplining
the labor force and rationalizing the labor market? One need not
accept these claims fully tp recognize that, since World War II, organ-
ized labor has become more integrated into the economic system of
advanced capitalism, progressively more dependent on its erstwhile
corporate adversaries, and largely conventional in the political
arena."0
8. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text.
9. The structure of postwar collective bargaining has been extensively criticized.
See S. ARoNowrrz, FALSE PROMISES (1973); J. BREcHER, STRIKE! (1972); C. Mims, TH
NEW MEN OF POWER (1948); J. O'CONNoR, THE FIscAL CmsIS OFT1 STATE (1973); W.
SERRIN, THE COMPANY AND THE UNION' (1973); C. SPENCER, BLUE COLLAR (1977); Bell,
The Subversion of Collective Bargaining, 29 COMMENTARY 185 (1960); Zeman,
Organized Labor versus "The Revolt Against Work:" The Critical Contest, TmES, Fall
1974, at 194.
10. Reference to the "incorporation" or "integration" of the working class refers
to the complex historical transition from a prototypical mode of working-class self-
consciousness (reflected in its institutions and struggles), in which the working class
saw itself as outcast, lacking entitlement to participation as of right in the affairs of
state, and forced by hostile social and political institutions to depend entirely on its
own efforts to secure economic and social betterment, to one in which it sees itself as
having claims upon the state, interests that are in part synonymous with those of the
state, and meaningful participation in the state's affairs. Paralleling this transforma-
tion is a process by which the earlier understanding of key political actors that relations
between capital and labor were essentially private transactions is transformed into a
perception that the adjustment of relations between capital and labor is, to a signifi-
cant degree, a concern of public policy.
This incorporation process is assumed to have a deradicalizing impact on working-
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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
How this transformation of the labor movement took place is the
broad underlying question motivating this Article. Obviously many
processes were at work-political, social, economic, and cultural. I
will make no attempt to canvass them here. I will focus only on what
was contributed to the deradicalization and incorporation of the
working class by developments within the relatively autonomous
dimension of legal consciousness, legal institutions, and legal prac-
tice, as revealed in the Supreme Court's early Wagner Act decisions."
I do not argue that there is a direct causal relationship between the
Supreme Court's decisions and the integration of the working class
into the postwar social order. But those decisions did have two more
indirect consequences worth noting. First, they provided the begin-
nings of the conceptual integration of the working class by laying the
intellectual groundwork upon which were later erected the prevailing
political theories of the postwar period, which in turn have in signifi-
cant measure been internalized by and become the self-conception of
the leadership of the labor movement.'" Second, in the process of
adopting some and foreclosing other paths of doctrinal development
under the relatively general terms of the Act, the Court began to
elaborate the boundaries of "legitimate" labor activity. This process
not only had some immediate political consequences in the 1930's but
its ultimate, more enduring, significance was the creation of the rudi-
class movements. "Incorporation" imports more than mere concessions by the estab-
lished order; it connotes a change in the self-conception of the working class. Of course,
the integrative process has never been totally effective; the point is not to make claims
of an absolute nature about American labor, but to point, by way of comparison to
the 1930's, to certain dominant tendencies in the postwar period, at least with respect
to the leadership of the labor movement, if not much of its rank and file.
In particular, I regard as inaccurate the view that the incorporation process has
negated any future prospect of working-class radicalism in the United States or that
it is possible to describe the working class as in any sense satisfied with current
standards of living in either the material or cultural aspects.
11. By focusing on the Supreme Court, I do not mean to imply that other legal
institutions, notably the National Labor Relations Board, did not also contribute to
the integrative process here described. I have emphasized the Court because some of
the most significant issues in this process are highlighted by the Court's several at-
tempts to define its relationship to the Board and to other courts.
12. The argument relies on the theory of hegemony articulated in the work of the
Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci. See A. GR Msci, SELECTIONS FROM TIE
PRIsoN NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith eds. and trans. 1971). See generally
C. BoGGs, GRAMscI's MARXISM (1976); J. CAMMmSr, ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND TIlE OIuOINS
OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM (1967); Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, Naw
LEFT REv., November 1976-January 1977, at 5; Williams, The Concept of "Egemonia"
in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation, 21 J. HIsT. IDEAS
586 (1960). By "hegemony" Gramsci meant "the permeation throughout civil society
- ..of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way
or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate
it." C. BooGs, supra at 39.
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ments of what later became an increasingly formalized and regulated
institutional structure for the state administration of the class strug-
gle.
It is not suggested that the Supreme Court engaged in a plot or
conspiracy to defeat or co-opt the labor movement, nor do I think that
the Court can adequately be understood as an instrument of particu-
lar economic interests." I emphatically reject any such reductionism
or determinism. That the Court did so much to guide the long-run
development of the labor movement into domesticated channels and,
indeed, to impede workers' interests is, in fact, ironic precisely be-
cause it was so often attacked by contemporaries as overly friendly
13. I adopt the concept of the "relative autonomy" of legal consciousness, insti-
tutions, and practice, notwithstanding my obvious commitment to the view that the
legal process is deeply imbedded in the political process and not only reflects the
political and class structure of American capitalism but serves to maintain and repro-
duce it. The view that law reflects the political and class structure does not require or
imply the reductionist argument that the legal process is directly responsive to the
needs and preferences of dominant social and political actors. See Balbus, Commodity
Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 571, 572-73 (1977). Indeed, though determinism regrettably remains the
popular conception of Marxist method, the most creative work on law within the
Marxist tradition begins with the rejection of economic determinism as an explanatory
mode. This intellectual traditiofi has sought to develop a theory adequate to explain
the way in which law ultimately reflects and sustains the social order, yet has its own
internal logic and unique modes of discourse and institutional patterns that are to
some extent independent of the will of powerful, nonlegal, social and political actors
and that represent an important constitutive element of the social totality in their own
right.
Different approaches have been attempted toward such a theory, including Bal-
bus' thesis of "structural homologies" and the thesis developed in the following pages
of lawmaking as a form of social and political practice. It must be conceded, however,
that at present no comprehensive theory of the relative autonomy of law exists. The
effort here is simply to acquaint the reader with this intellectual project and to indicate
some paths of ongoing research. See generally D. HAY, P. LinMIAUGH, J. RULE, E.P.
THOMPSON, & C. WiNsLow, ALBiON's FATAL TRma (1975); E.P. TOMPSsoN, WtuGS AND
HuNTRxS: THE OfiGiN OF THE BLAcK Acr (1975); Gabel, Intention and Structure in
Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L.
REv. 601 (1977); Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in SovmT
LEGAL PHiLosoPmy 111 (H. Babb trans. 1951); Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American
Law, 1 MARMT PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming); Tushnet, Perspectives on the Develop-
ment of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of American Law,"
1977 Wis. L. REv. 81; Gabel, Book Review, 91 HAv. L. PEv. 302 (1977) (R. Dwomm,
TAKING RIGHTs SERiousLY); A. Fraser, Legal Theory and Legal Practice, in Arena. A
Marxist Journal of Crificism & Discussion, Nos. 44-45 (1976) (published in Greens-
boro, Victoria, Australia; copy in Harvard University Library).
Analogous lines of development also appear in recent debates between the instru-
mentalist, structuralist, and neo-Hegelian positions within the neo-Marxist theory of
the state. See Gold, Lo, & Wright, Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the
Capitalist State (pts. 1-2), MoNrHL REv., October 1975, at 29 & November 1975, at
36; Wolfe, New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics, 4 POL & Soc'Y 131 (1974).
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to labor. Many decisions of the prewar period were intended to be,
and were then understood as, tremendous victories for organized
labor." But these prolabor victories contained the seeds of long-term
defeats, because through them the Court, including its most liberal
members, set in motion a distinctive style of legal analysis character-
istic of modern American legal consciousness'5 that came to stand,
whatever the intentions of its authors, as an ineluctable barrier to
worker self-activity.
II. THE SETTING
At the outset, it is appropriate to situate the focus of this Article
within its historical and political context.'" What follows is a provi-
sional and schematic outline of the relationship of the Article to the
revisionist controversy in American historiography,'" followed by a
location of the issues herein discussed within the crosscurrents of
14. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); notes
185-88 infra and accompanying text.
15. See text following note 49 infra.
16. This Article will consider the work of the Court from the 1937 decision up-
holding the Act, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), to Pearl
Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, the creation of the National War Labor Board on January
12, 1942, see Exec. Order No. 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1938-1943 compilation), reprinted
in 9 L.R.R.M. 945 (1943), and such other wartime enactments as the War Labor
Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), so radically altered the legal status of labor
that the conceptual scheme of the NLRA was temporarily abandoned. The system of
labor relations that emerged during World War II involved routine state intervention
into the substantive terms of collective bargaining; settlement of labor disputes by
compulsory mediation or arbitration without resort to economic action; the prohibition
of concerted activity, enforced both by the law and by the politics of the "no-strike
pledge"; the development of governmentally sanctioned union security devices that
served as a basis for stabilizing (and bureaucratizing) the leadership of labor; and
delegation to labor's leadership of the role of disciplining rank-and-file employees in
the name of productivity and at the expense of the militant defense of workers' inter-
ests. Concurrently, top labor leaders were co-opted onto various boards and agencies,
thus increasing their distance from the rank-and-file while cementing their now
"junior partner" role in national politics.
The War's end was followed by one of the most momentous strike waves in Ameri-
can history, but a dramatic shift in the political climate soon occurred within both
labor and the nation at large. The restrictions imposed on labor by the Taft-Hartley
Act abruptly foreclosed any radical departures within the legal plane, just as the Cold
War foreclosed any opening to the left on the political plane. The nascent working-
class radicalism of the 1930's and early 1940's was arrested, and the potentiality for
reform of the workplace was forestalled for a generation.
Until recently very little work had been done on the situation of labor in the 1940's.
the imagination of far more social historians being captured by the 1930's. This deft-
ciency, which seriously distorts our understanding of the labor movement, is now being
remedied by a new generation of historians. See generally American Labor in the
1940's, RADICAL AMERICA, July-August 1975 (Special Issue).
17. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
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modem American jurisprudence. Considerations of space prevent me
from fully developing or defending the positions advanced; they are
offered simply to provide a sense of the background and to alert the
reader to my political assumptions."
A. THE THEORY OF CoRPoArAT LiBERALisM
The assumptions of Progressive historiography dominated writ-
ing about the Constitution and the Supreme Court, particularly re-
garding the problem of social reform, in the period from the beginning
of the century through the Court-packing crisis of 1937."1 Progressive
historiography viewed the American past as a slow but steady march
toward the democratization of society. The animating force behind
this progress, was the conflict between privileged and nonprivileged
groups identified either on a sectoral or regional basis or more typi-
cally on the basis of economic interest.2 Characteristically, proper-
tied interests were viewed as being in perennial conflict with groups
who possessed relatively little or no property-the farmer, the con-
sumer, the small businessperson, the worker-in short, the "people."
Progressive historiography regarded liberalism as a movement of the
underprivileged, assisted by the enlightened middle class, to curb the
power and interests of the propertied and business classes.'
18. The same disclaimer applies to my admittedly polemical discussion of con-
tractualism. See text accompanying notes 93-102 infra. Recognizing the controversial
nature of the propositions advanced, the effort has been to set the stage for the case
analysis and to expose my political assumptions without burdening the text with a full-
scale defense of these assumptions.
19. See Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 Ymz L.J. 668,
672-78 (1933)(tracing the impact of Progressivism as an historiographical school and
as a political movement on the acrimonious pre-New Deal debate over the political role
of the Supreme Court). Classical works in this tradition include C. BF.mm, AN Eco-
NOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CoNSTrrUTON OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); C. BEARD.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONsTMrnoN (1912); J. SlurH, THE Surr OF AMERucAN
GovERNMENTr (1907).
20. See S. LYND, Introduction: Beyond Beard, in CLASS CONFLiCr, SLVERY, AND
THE UNrrED STATES CoNsTuio N: TEN ESSAYS 3 (1967); Bernstein, Introduction to
TOWARDS A NEW PAST at vi (B. Bernstein ed. 1968).
The Progressive viewpoint may appear closely allied with Marxism, but the differ-
ence between the two perspectives is fundamental. The former looks not toward a
break with the assumptions and goals of classical liberal political thought, but to their
extension to, and realization in, all spheres of social life. This goal is typically thought
to be capable of realization within the governmental and economic framework of Amer-
ican capitalism, at least in its broadest outlines. Marxism, on the other hand, repre-
sents a decisive break with the liberal political tradition and views a comprehensive
change in the socioeconomic and political system as a necessary component of the
democratization of social life.
21. In Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s classic formulation, "liberalism in America
has been ordinarily the movement on the part of the other sections of society to restrain
1978]
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The rise of the historiographical tradition was connected to the
ferment generated by the Progressive political movement of the early
twentieth century. This movement was the political articulation of
the liberalism of that era and took as an article of faith that the
American democratic destiny would evolve through governmental
regulation of business in the interests of the public. The Interstate
Commerce Act (1887),2 the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890),23 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act (1914),'2 for example, were seen as so
many milestones of liberal achievement in the defense of the common
people. In fact, the entire branch of modern legal thought known as
administrative law, whatever its origins in the ancient common law
writs, is symbiotically connected to the Progressive vision.2
The Progressive tradition viewed the Supreme Court as hope-
lessly out of touch with modern reality and beyond the reach of the
democratic process. The institution of judicial review was particu-
larly attacked as a key mechanism by which the representatives of
Big Business were able to place a brake on needed social reform. In
Max Lerner's formulation,
[clapitalist enterprise in America generated, as capitalism has ev-
erywhere generated, forces in government and in the underlying
classes hostile to capitalist expansion and bent upon curbing it: it
became the function of the Court to check those forces and to lay
down the lines of economic orthodoxy. . . . [The Court]. . . may
be regarded from other angles. But if we seek a single and consistent
body of principles which will furnish the rationale of the judicial
power in the last half century, we must find it in the dynamics of
American business enterprise.$
The heirs of Progressivism therefore viewed the dramatic 1937 turn
of the Court toward an attitude of jildicial deference to legislative
the power of the business community." A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 505
(1945).
22. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
23. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)).
24. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970)).
25. "The administrative process has, during the last seventy-five years, been the
characteristic instrument of political and economic reform." L. JAFFE & N. NATIIANSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 7 (3d ed. 1968).
The descendents of Progressivism would later see the New Deal as the consumma-
tion of the reform process. See sources cited in Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conserv-
ative Achievements of Liberal Reform, in TOWARDS A NEw PAST, supra note 20, at 263
nn.1 & 2.
26. Lerner, supra note 19, at 672. Lerner also says that, during the Progressive
Era, it became "a general assumption among the students of the Court that the
decisions of the justices could be explained by their economic interests and sympa-
thies." Id. at 676.
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authority (classically but somewhat naively viewed as the repository
of the popular will) as a triumph for democracy, a great divide that
fundamentally resolved the problem of the role of the courts in a
liberal democratic society.
In the 1960's, some historians began to rethink the legacy of
Progressivism, both as a political movement and as a description of
the American past. There arose a revisionist version of American
history, known as the theory of corporate liberalismY The proponents
of this theory rejected Progressive historiography as historically inac-
curate and politically misleading. In their view, liberal economic and
political reform was not adequately described as an imposition upon
Big Business. On the contrary, most significant modern reforms were
enacted with the tacit approval, if not ardent support, of major corpo-
rate interests, because the more sophisticated sectors of the business
community recognized that government intervention in the private
sector was essential to rationalize 9 the chaos of a market economy,
to enhance the stability, predictability, and security of the competi-
tive capitalist system, and to provide a stable political environment
27. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
28. See, e.g., G. KoLKo, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); G. KoLKo,
THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); R. RADOSH, AMERICAN LABOR AND UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY (1969); J. WEISTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIaBR.AiL STATE: 1900-
1918 (1968); W. WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AmERICAN HISTORY (1961); W. Wxu AMS,
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1959); Radosh, The Corporate Ideology of
American Labor Leaders from Gompers to HiUman, STUDIES ON THE LmFT, November-
December 1966, at 66; Sklar, On the Proletarian Revolution and the End of Political-
Economic Society, RADICAL AMERICA, May-Jund 1969, at 1; Sklar, Woodrow Wilson and
the Political Economy of Modern United States Liberalism, STUDIES ON THlE LEFr, Fill
1960, at 17; D. Eakins, The Development of Corporate Liberal Policy Research in the
United States, 1885-1965 (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of Wis-
consin Library). See generally 'New Left Historians' Of the 1960s, RADICAL AMIFuCA,
November 1970, at 81.
It should be noted that, besides the theory of corporate liberalism, the postwar
period produced another major school, led by the so-called "consensus" historians.
notably Daniel Boorstin and Louis Hartz, that also defined itself in opposition to
Progressive historiography. See R. HoFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 437-66
(1968).
29. Kolko defines "rationalization" as the utilization of political outlets by the
major economic interests to achieve stability ("the elimination of internecine compe-
tition and erratic fluctuations in the economy"); predictability ("the ability . . . to
plan future economic action on the basis of fairly calculable expectations"); and secu-
rity ("protection from the political attacks [upon the major economic interests] latent
in any formally democratic political structure"). "I mean by [rationalization] the
organization of the economy and the larger political and social spheres in a manner
that will allow corporations to function in a predictable and secure environment
permitting reasonable profits over the long run." G. KoLKo, THE TRIUMPH OF
CONSERVATISM 3 (1963).
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in which the corporations could get on with the business of making
reasonable profits. In short, the revisionist historians argued that,
notwithstanding the laissez-faire and social-Darwinist rhetoric some-
times circulated for public consumption, Big Business systematically
sought and achieved a political capitalism in which the state played
a crucial, rationalizing role designed to protect corporate interests
and retrieve the business world from recurring market crises. What-
ever reforms and concessions were enacted in the process furthered
these ends and forestalled even more radical measures that might
have been enacted into law or imposed by extraparliamentary pres-
sures had popular discontent been permitted to crystallize into a
coherent oppositional political force.
3 1
Corporate liberal research has thus far produced its most signifi-
cant results with regard to the Progressive Era proper .3 Although
attempts have been made to assimilate New Deal politics into the
corporate liberal theory,3" in my view these have inadequately con-
30. It was further argued that middle class reformers, however sincere, played a
limited and ultimately subordinate role in defining the nature of Progressive reform.
Likewise, the Left (e.g., the Socialist Party and the IWW in the early part of this
century) lacked a comprehensive alternative vision to Progressivism and was unable
to articulate a comprehensive democratic and redistributive program of its own. Ac-
cordingly, it also played a subordinate, largely futile role in defining the content of
political reform. See J. WEINSTEIN, TIE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMEICA, 1912-1925
(1967); Weinstein, The Left, Old and New, SOCIAIST REVOLUTION, July-August 1972,
at 7.
31. The corporate liberal theorists have produced very little writing about the
Supreme Court or about legal institutions generally. Kolko, however, has some brief
notes about the Supreme Court's early treatment of railroad legislation that show the
deficiency of the "economic interpretation" of the pre-New Deal Court and dramati-
cally illustrate the methodological assumption made here that legal practice must
always be seen as a relatively autonomous social force, not the mere resultant of
prevailing economic and political vectors. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
Referring to the period around the turn of the century, he argues that, although most
of the Justices identified with and favored business interests, they frequently had
difficulty penetrating business' laissez-faire rhetoric and appreciating its need and
desire for governmental intervention in the economy. Decisions written by Justices who
imagined themselves to be providing aid and comfort to the corporations by vitiating
regulatory legislation therefore did great harm to vital business interests because those
interests were fundamentally misunderstood. See G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND
REGULATION, 1877-1916, at 80-83 (1965).
32. See, e.g., G. DOMHOFF, supra note 4, ch. 6. A more balanced viewpoint may
be found in Bernstein, America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism, in TOwARDS
A NEW PAST, supra note 20, at 289; and Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conservative
Achievements of Liberal Reform, in TOWARDS A NEW PAST, supra note 20, at 263. The
Wagner Act itself points to certain continuities with the earlier period, since the statu-
tory scheme has origins in the war labor policies of Woodrow Wilson's administration.
The continuities between earlier labor legislation and the NLRA are explored in Smith,
The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 Micil. L. REv.
1065 (1941). The Supreme Court acknowledged this continuity with the World War I
experience in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183-85 (1941).
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fronted the central difficulty presented by the Wagner Act. Although
over the long run the institutionalization of collective bargaining has
served corporate interests in economic stability and predictability,
the historical record makes emphatically clear that the business com-
munity, with few exceptions, did not initially conceive collective bar-
gaining to be in its long-run interests, resisted passage of the Act, and
later attempted to shape it or its own ends only when forced to obey
it by working people and their allies in the federal government. In
short, although the corporate liberal thesis is a good starting point
from which to describe the general contours of the emergence of post-
World War I monopoly capitalism, both it and the conventional inter-
pretation of New Deal labor law reform, influenced by the Progressive
tradition, are inadequate to explain fully the events of the period.Y
A major goal of this Article is to supply the groundwork for a
more intricate explanation of this most perplexing problem of New
Deal historiography, affirming both the context of class struggle that
surrounded the early years of the Wagner Act and the role of the Act
in stabilizing and preserving the social order of American capitalism.
B. THE CRISIS OF THE LEGAL ORDER3'
During the Depression, capitalism entered a period of profound,
world-wide crisis, not only economically but also in politics, culture,
and law. The particular manifestation of this crisis in law was the
33. Thus, conceding the influence of the revisionist school, this Article nonethe-
less reflects the more recent development toward a critical perspective on the theory
of corporate liberalism, particularly insofar as it exaggerates the self-consciousness and
rationality of the dominant business sectors, and the ability of the system to reform
itself, and minimizes the significance of popular resistance. See Twhr'nru.-CcrURY
AMERCA: RECENT INTERPRETATIONS 6-8 (B. Bernstein & A. Matusow eds. 1969); Block.
Beyond Corporate Liberalism, 24 Soc. PROB. 352 (1977). See also Schatz, The End of
Corporate Liberalism: Class Struggle in the Electrical Manufacturing Industry, 1933.
1950, RADIcAL AtmCA, July-August 1975, at 187.
On the other hand, the conventional interpretation of the Wagner Act, as imposed
upon the business community in the interests of the American worker by an enlight-
ened government, is also inadequate. See notes 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
This interpretation fails to do justice to the massive, extraparliamentary struggle
waged by the working class during the period, without which the legislation probably
would have meant very little, nor does it confront the profoundly conservative implica-
tions of New Deal labor law reform.
34. I have focused these contextual notes on the rise of legal realism, but ob-
viously the cases to be discussed were also decided against the backdrop of three more
well-known and politically explicit legal debates of the 1930's: the "commerce-power"
question; the Court-packing crisis; and the pre-NLRA debate regarding the legal sta-
tus of organized labor, particularly in light of the antitrust laws. As to the last, see I.
BERNSTEI, TH'E LzA YEARS, ch. 4 (1960); F. FRANKFuRTE & N. GREENF, Tim LBaoR
INJUNCTION (1930); Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws, 34 ILL. L. REv. 769
(1940).
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incipient disintegration of liberal legalism.
"Legalism" has been defined as "[t]he ethical attitude that
holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules."3
"Liberal legalism" is a particular historical incarnation of the legalist
outlook, which characteristically serves as the philosophical founda-
tion of the legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies.'" Its
essential features are the commitment to general, democratically pro-
mulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and
the radical separation of morals, politics, and personality from judi-
cial action.3 7 Liberal legalism also consists of a complex of social
practices and institutions that complement and elaborate upon its
underlying political philosophy and jurisprudence. With respect to its
modern Anglo-American form, these include adherence to precedent,
separation of the legislative (prospective) and the judicial (retrospec-
tive) functions, the obligation to formulate legal rules on a general
basis (the notion of ratio decidendi), adherence to complex proce-
dural formalities, and the search for specialized methods of analysis
("legal reasoning"). All of these institutions are designed to serve the
fundamental desideratum of separating morals, politics, and per-
sonal bias from adjudication. 8 The rise and elaboration of the ide-
35. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964).
36. See generally L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); M. HouwTZ, ORIGINS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (tent. ed. 1973); F. NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law in
Modern Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 22 (H. Marcuse ed.
1957); Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J.L. & EcoN.
621 (1976); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1974).
37: The last of these commitments is embodied in the claim that the liberal state
is a "government of laws, and not of men." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137, 163 (1803).
38. The historical development and interrelationships of these practices and
their connection to liberal legalist jurisprudence are traced in M. HoswITz, supra note
36. See generally Horwitz, supra note 36.
Horwitz points out that, although the central institution of separation of powers
is ordinarily justified as a device to subordinate the judiciary to the popular will as
expressed in legislation, it arose historically in the United States in connection with
the development of the institution of judicial review as a conservative justification for
checking and impeding the redistributive and egalitarian tendencies imagined to be
inherent in popularly elected legislatures.
Liberal legalist jurisprudence is closely related to the classical liberal political
tradition. The metaphysical underpinnings of the enumerated practices are supplied
by the central philosophical themes of that tradition: the notion that values are subjec-
tive and derive from personal desire, and that therefore ethical discourse is conducted
profitably only in instrumental terms; the view that society is an artificial aggregation
of autonomous individuals; the separation in political philosophy between public and
private interests (between state and civil society); and a commitment to a formal or
procedural rather than a substantive conception of justice.
These themes are sounded in the great writings of the classical liberal political
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ology, practices, and institutions of liberal legalism have been accom-
panied by the growth of a specialized, professional caste of experts
trained in manipulating legal reasoning and the legal process.
Not surprisingly, the crisis of liberal capitalism revealed itself
within law as a breakdown of the separation between law and politics
and between law and private interests, 1 as a tendency for law and
politics to merge or for law to become politicized." The political
character of adjudication was already fairly apparent to labor activ-
ists, but the Supreme Court decisions of the early (pre-1937) New
Deal striking down reform legislation cast the politics of the Court
into stark relief."
Within academic legal circles, the primary manifestation of the
crisis of liberalism was the rise of the legal realist reaction to
"conceptualist formalism." "Formalism" refers to styles of legal rea-
tradition, as exemplified in the work of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David
Hume. The interrelationship of the ethical, psychological, social, and political assump-
tions characteristic of the liberal tradition is developed in R. UNoa, KN-oitiZDGF &
PoLTcs (1975); the connection of these metaphysical assumptions to liberal legalist
jurisprudence and the unity of liberal legalist thought are discussed in chapter 2 of that
work and in R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SociETY (1976). The connection of the meta-
physical premises of the liberal tradition to liberal legalism is also explored in Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1766-
78 (1976).
39. There is, of course, no claim implied here that at any time prior to the crisis
of the 1930's the legal order was in fact autonomous from politics, but only that it
became increasingly difficult in the 1930's to maintain the legalist belief that this was,
could, or should be so.
40. See F. NEUMAN, supra note 36. The most dramatic example of this phe-
nomenon was the rise of Nazi and Fascist law in Germany and Italy respectively, see
id.; F. NEUMAN, BmmMOTH: THE STucruE AND PRAcnCE OF NATONAL SOcoAUSM,
1933-1944 (rev. ed. 1944), although there is some question whether "fascist law" is.
properly speaking, entitled to the name "law" at all. Obviously this debate goes to the
heart of the liberal legalist belief that law is something more than the mere command
of those in power and contains as part of its essential nature an autonomous and
reasoned character. Compare Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals.
71 HARv. L. Rav. 593 (1958), with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
Liberal capitalism in the United States enjoyed more flexibility and resiliency
than perhaps anywhere else in the world, and the traumatic experiences of Central
Europe were avoided. The transformation of the old order into the new was more
modulated, involving less disruption to the social fabric. The remarkable suppleness
of liberal capitalism in the United States is one of the central facts of our political
history, particularly the history of the limitations of our left-wing movements. Yet
rarely is a critical attempt made to account for it, historians often contenting them-
selves with references to the myth of American classlessness or to the sage pragmatism
of our political leaders.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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soning that assume that the processes of deriving legal rules to govern
new situations and of applying ascertained rules to given sets of facts
can be relatively determinate, objective, and value-free operations,
which proceed according to specialized modes of analytical deduc-
tion. Logically and historically, formalism is connected to formal
conceptions of justice." "Conceptualism" is a particular version of
formalism that was the prevailing mode of thought among the legal
elite in the United States in the period roughly from 1885 to 1930.1
The characteristic conceptualist glosses to formalism are the belief
that very abstract and general principles of law can be used to resolve
very concrete legal problems and an identification of legal reasoning
with natural science."
"Realism" denotes a movement in legal thought that united
thinkers of disparate political philosophies in an attack on concep-
tualism. As a style of legal reasoning, realism denies the objective and
autonomous character of rule-formulation and rule-application and
assumes the indeterminacy of legal concepts and rules. It sees legal
reasoning as a purposive or instrumental, rather than a purely deduc-
tive, enterprise, and it asserts that proper judicial action requires and
may legitimately involve inquiry into the social policies intended to
be served by legal rules and the practical social consequences of a
court's decisions.
Plainly, realism threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the
legal process by politicizing it. This could not be otherwise when it
was proposed that the decision of cases explicitly turn on the judge's
assessment of competing notions of social policy. This is by definition
the danger that liberal legalism had hitherto sought to avoid.,' The
42. The distinction between formalistic and purposive legal reasoning and their
respective connections to formal and substantive conceptions of justice are discussed
in R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIMET 194-216 (1976).
43. A pathbreaking examination of conceptualism is D. Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of Classical Legal Thought, 1865-1940 (1975) (unpublished manuscript on file at
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW).
44. Labor law issues have supplied the context for many of the classics of concep-
tualism. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage legisla-
tion); Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (union enjoined from
organizing mine without mine owner's consent); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(yellow-dog contract); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (yellow-dog con-
tract); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hours legislation); In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (sweeping labor injunction).
45. This is not to claim, of course, that formalism successfully banished politics
from law or that formalist judges decided cases without being influenced by articulate
conceptions of social policy. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, one of the achievements of realism was to expose the value-laden
character of formalistic legal reasoning. The point is that formalism denied the desira-
bility of politically purposive judicial action and purportedly searched for methods to
avoid overtly political or value-laden decisions. That is, formalism and realism differed
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realists did not call for the demise of the rule of law, but they did urge
candor about the ethical and political character of all legal decisions
and believed that instrumental decisionmaking was proper and just.
In Felix Cohen's words,
creative legal thought will more and more look behind the tradition-
ally accepted principles of "justice" and "reason" to appraise in
ethical terms the social values at stake in any choice between two
precedents.
"Social policy" will be comprehended not as an emergency fac-
tor in legal argument but rather as the gravitational field that gives
weight to any rule or precedent, whether it be in constitutional law,
in the law of trademarks, or in the most technical details of legal
procedure. 6
Realist jurisprudence released a radically destabilizing force
within legalism. This was not widely perceived at first, partly because
realism spread initially among academics, not judges, and partly
because, other than a generalized inclination of many toward Presi-
dent Roosevelt and the New Deal, the realists shared no explicit
political program. In time, when realism ascended to the bench, its
subversive content became more apparent. This in turn provoked a
conceptualist counterattack, although this reaction was to be ob-
scured by its adoption of the language and style of realist discourse."
The cases I will discuss occur against the backdrop of the traumatic
encounter between conceptualism and realism.
It is commonly believed that during the New Deal a
"revolution"" occurred in American legal thought in general, and
labor law in particular, that swept away the cobwebs of archaic con-
ceptualism and, for the first time, gave the poor and the downtrodden
a fair hearing in the courts of the land." It is imagined that this
in the first instance as theories of the kinds of justifications that might legitimately
be advanced in support of judicial decisions. See R. UNOER, LAW IN MODERN SocIMar
194, 205 (1976). While by no means equivalent to a description of what actually takes
place in adjudication, the self-consciousness and assumptions of a jurisprudential
approach are, of course, crucial components of its political legitimacy. Realism implic-
itly posed the question whether a sophisticated, contemporary jurisprudence necessar-
ily clashed with, or even pushed beyond the boundaries of, liberal legalism.
46. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLW.
L. REv. 809, 833-34 (1935).
47. The revival of conceptualism was not the only line of attack on realism. See.
e.g., L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF (2d ed. 1966).
48. See, e.g., I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, ch. 13.
49. The opening shots of this revolution were believed to be the Supreme Court's
decisions in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
The upholding of the NLRA in the Jones & Laughlin Steel case was, of
course, the handwriting on the wall which the more astute of the country's
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revolution coincided with, indeed resulted from, the triumph of legal
realism, particularly in the Supreme Court, in the persons of Justices
Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter, but also more generally in the legal
establishment.
This period clearly marked a new era in our legal history.
Whether "revolution" is the appropriate word to describe that trans-
formation is another question. Likewise, whereas legal realism un-
doubtedly came into its own, whether it consigned conceptualism to
the dustbin of history is also problematic. In my view the dividing
line between the Old Court and the New is much more indistinct than
is commonly supposed. The early Labor Board cases were an at-
tempt-at the height of the so-called labor law revolution-to fore-
stall the disintegration of legalism that is the necessary consequence
of the merger of law and politics and to assimilate realism to main-
stream legalist jurisprudence by diluting its implicit political con-
tent. Put another way, liberal legalism exhibited the same resilience
in its moment of crisis as did the American political system as a whole
during the Depression. The Labor Board cases marked the emergence
of a distinctively modern legal consciousness that eventually su-
perseded realism in the direction of a new "social conceptualism." In
effect, each side in the debate tacitly refrained from pushing the
internal logic of its position to its ultimate conclusions and was even-
tually absorbed into its adversary. The resultant, hybrid style of legal
reasoning was more attentive to social and political realities and more
self-conscious and candid about the political character of adjudica-
tion than its conceptualist predecessor. But like the latter, it was
premised on the notion that a disjunction between law and politics
is necessary to legitimate the judical role, and it sought in the rea-
soned elaboration of neutral principles a method for upholding the
law/politics distinction. The new social conceptualism reproduced
the formal, undemocratic, and uncritical character of the old. The
New Deal solution to the crisis of legalism was to update legal con-
sciousness and to make it more responsive to contemporary social
exigencies-that is, to give a new life to the liberal legal order-while
at the same time preserving its contradictions and mystifications.
The Labor Board cases were a significant early episode in this pro-
cess.
business leaders were well able to read. Unionization followed as a matter
of course, and the hoary fiction of freedom of contract between labor and
management was quietly laid to rest.
2 W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 107 (1970). But
see H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (Black, J.) ("One of these
fundamental policies [of the Wagner Act] is freedom of contract.").
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C. THE WAGNER ACr: GOALS AND PERCEPTIONS
It is not easy to discern and articulate the goals of the NLRA.
The legislative history is often vague and inconclusive, and on many
issues that were subsequently the subject of burning debate, Congress
simply expressed no legislative intent.50 Nonetheless, from the
"Findings and Policy" incorporated in section 1 of the Act' and from
the labor law cases and literature, it is possible to identify at least
six statutory goals:
1. Industrial Peace: By encouraging collective bargaining, the
Act aimed to subdue "strikes and other forms of industrial strife or
unrest,"52 because industrial warfare interfered with interstate com-
merce; that is, it was unhealthy in a business economy.m Moreover,
50. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 32 (legislative history of section 8(5) of the
NLRA).
51. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). That the
policy statement of section 1 is not mere surplusage safely to be ignored is particularly
clear in light of the express language of section 10(c) commanding the Board to fashion
such remedies "as will effectuate the policies of this Act," id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. §
160(c), and the similar command in section 9(b) that the "appropriateness" of a unit
for collective bargaining purposes is to be measured against the policies of the Act, see
id. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
In the early years of the Act, this statement of policy played a central role in the
debate over whether and to what degree courts were to defer to the Board's "informed
judgment" on labor law matters. This controversy, of course, was intimately connected
with the crisis of legalism. Traditionalists warned that judicial deference to
"administrative discretion" would mark the end of the rule of law. The Court's defense
of administrative discretion in the face of this charge was essential to the rise of our
modern administrative practice and to the accomplishment of the purposes of the Act
itself. The existence of some statutory standards or principles to which the Court could
point as placing at least apparent limits or boundaries on administrative discretion was
crucial strategically to its ability so firmly to defend the new administrative law.
52. Id. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
53. Ironically, section 13 of the Act emphatically affirms the right to strike, and
its sponsors must have known that in the short run the Act would encourage workers
to exercise this right on a massive scale, which is exactly what happened. Thus, the
industrial peace rationale only makes sense on the assumption that employers would
eventually come to their senses and accept collective bargaining as more productive
from the long-run standpoint of the business system than intransigent efforts to hold
back the clock. In other words, the Act gave workers a powerful weapon in industrial
warfare so that industrial warfare would, in the long run, be dissipated. Not only does
this show that the sponsors of the Act had a rather awesome confidence in their own
foresight, but also that they were fully prepared to wait on the sidelines while
revitalized unions clobbered backward employers into submission. See Lynd, The
United Front in America: A Note, RlWcAI AMERICA, July-August 1974, at 29.
Not surprisingly, once section 13 served its purpose, the Court and Congress began
to impose elaborate restrictions on the right to strike and other potentially disruptive
activity. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (picketing rights subordi-
nated to property rights); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (minority concerted activity unprotected); Linden
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although this thought was not embodied in the text, industrial war-
fare clearly promoted other undesirable conditions, such as political
turmoil, violence, and general uncertainty.
2. Collective Bargaining: The Act sought to enhance collective
bargaining for its own sake because of its presumed "mediating" or
"therapeutic" impact on industrial conflict. 4
3. Bargaining Power: The Act aimed to promote "actual liberty
of contract" 5 by redressing the unequal balance of bargaining power
between employers and employees.56
Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974) (restriction of the recognitional strike);
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (restrictions on safety strikes); Boys
Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (revival of the labor
injunction); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (implication
of no-strike clause); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(barring strike to win demand on "permissive subject"); Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 8(b)(4), 303, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), 187 (1970) (prohibiting
secondary activity); id. §§ 206-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (restrictions on strikes imper-
iling national health or safety).
54. In the words of the congressional finding: "Experience has proved that pro-
tection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively ...
promotes the flow of commerce ...by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes." National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act §
1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). This premise has been elaborated into a philosophy of
collective bargaining as an ideal of rational and informed persuasion. By this view,
much industrial conflict could be alleviated simply by an intelligent exchange of views
and information at the bargaining table. See generally Cox, The Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1408-09 (1958). Notwithstanding the finding of
Congress just quoted and Cox's view that the sponsors of the Act undoubtedly hoped
to accomplish this goal, Cox says it is unclear whether the goal, as well as the goal of
industrial democracy, see note 60 infra, was written directly into the statute. Cox,
supra at 1408-09.
55. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). This
concept of "actual" liberty of contract is also invoked in the Norris-LaGuardia Act §
2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
56. The Wagner Act is ambiguous as to how much "redressing" was to take
place. Section 1 states that legal protection of unionization and collective bargaining
promotes commerce "by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees." National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (em-
phasis added). This phrase might mean that in administering the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board was consciously to seek an even balance of forces between
capital and labor. Alternatively, it might mean, more modestly, that, in Congress'
view, collective bargaining in and of itself put capital and labor on an equal footing.
Cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (workers' be-
lief in unionism may be protected by law "in order to establish the equality of position
between the parties in which liberty of contract begins").
At any rate, in Cox's words, "[tlhe most important purpose of the Wagner Act
was to create aggregations of economic power on the side of employees countervailing
the existing power of corporations to establish labor standards." Cox, supra note 54,
at 1407. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 506-07 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., separate opinion) (citation omitted).
The main purpose of the Wagner Act was to put the force of law behind
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4. Free Choice: The Act was intended to protect the free choice
of workers to associate amongst themselves and to select representa-
tives of 'their own choosing for collective bargaining.5'
5. Underconsumption: The Act was designed to promote eco-
nomic recovery and to prevent future depressions by increasing the
earnings and purchasing power of workers. -s
the promotion of unionism as the legitimate and necessary instrument "to
give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer." Equality
of bargaining power between capital and labor, to use the conventional ter.
minology of our predominant economic system, was the aim of this legisla-
tion.
No doubt it was contemplated that these new aggregations of economic power
would be strong in an absolute sense and that they would come to play a significant
role in political and social life as well as in collective bargaining. That is, it was a
general goal of the Act to promote union organization and to make unions powerful.
57. This principle of employee freedom of association was sometimes deemed a
"fundamental right" that pre-existed enactment of the Act. See NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); text accompanying note 156 infra.
58. Section 1 of the Act explicitly finds that the unequal bargaining power of
employees "tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners." National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). If these words mean anything at all, they mean that
Congress intended the Act to result in a redistribution of income shares in favor of wage
earners. Though the redistributive goals were virtually read out of the Act by judicial
and administrative interpretation, references to the underconsumption theory were
retained in the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 1. 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1970), and a faint echo of the theory appears, somewhat out of place, in the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 2(c)(4).'29
U.S.C. § 401(c)(4)(1970).
Considerations of space bar anything but the brief notes that follow on the politi-
cal economy of the Wagner Act. I have relied extensively on E. HAwLEY, THe NEw DEAL
AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966). The New Deal never had an economic policy:
rather, it had several articulated and competing perspectives. Thus, the group most
closely identified with the corporate liberal tradition within Big Business saw over-
production as the greatest evil and advocated a program of restrictions on output,
downward price rigidity, and market division, i.e., governmentally protected, rational-
ized oligopoly. A second center of opinion favored market rationalization, but in the
context of redistribution of income to counteract underconsumption, a more rational
allocation of resources, and some sort of national economic planning. This group looked
toward new units of "countervailing power" (unions, farmers' groups, cooperatives,
consumers' groups) as its constituency. A third major perspective was faithful to tradi-
tional antitrust ideals and saw restoration of the competitive market as the key to
recovery and social justice. This group looked to small businesspeople, large corporate
interests operating in certain atypical markets, and rural Progressives for its political
support.
Each of these perspectives found a significant reflection in the scheme of the
NLRA. The restrictionist emphasis prevailed in the fundamental decision to legalize
combination ("concerted activity") in the market governing the sale of labor power;
the "planning theme" shows through both in the creation of a government agency with
the novel charter to oversee the collective bargaining process and in the self-
consciously redistributive focus of section 1 of the Act; and finally, significant antitrust
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
6. Industrial Democracy: This is the most elusive aspect of the
legislative purpose, although most commentators indicate that a con-
cept of industrial democracy is embedded in the statutory scheme,
or at the least was one of the articulated goals of the sponsors of the
Act. Senator Wagner frequently sounded the industrial democracy
theme in ringing notes, 59 and scholars have subsequently seen in
collective bargaining "the means of establishing industrial democ-
racy, . . . the means of providing for the workers' lives in industry
the sense of worth, of freedom, and of participation that democratic
government promises them as citizens."6 Indeed, one carefully
argued study has gone so far as to conclude that
Congress viewed the objective of the Act as establishing throughout
the country as the normal relationship between employer and em-
ployees, a system whereby employees would participate through
their representatives in governing all matters affecting their condi-
tions of work. . . .When judges and the public become more famil-
ideals were reflected in the Act's underconsumptionist explanations of the Depression
and its attempted creation of decentralized foci of countervailing power to combat
"bigness."
President Roosevelt personally made no choice as between these competing strate-
gies. Eventually he and his advisers stumbled into spending, as such, as a compromise
solution to the intractable problems posed by their policy paralysis in the face of the
1937-1938 recession. Roosevelt's inconsistency and ambivalence on economic policy
brilliantly complemented his personalistic, consensus style of politics, but guaranteed
that the New Deal would make no fundamental transformation of the economic order.
True, he alienated the business community by encouraging the rhetoric of economic
redistribution, particularly in the period 1935-1937. But he never entertained a serious
intention of attacking the hegemony of corporate interests. The "shift to the left" in
the mid-1930's coincided with a turn to the right in economic policy and the defeat of
the idea of national planning. Without denying its humanitarian achievements, the
New Deal accomplished far less than is imagined in the area of redistribution of wealth
and power. See Bernstein, America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism, in
TOWARDS A NEW PAST, supra note 20, at 289; Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conserva-
tive Achievements of Liberal Reform, in ToWARDS A NEW PAST, supra note 20, at 263.
Ironically, Roosevelt on the one hand helped the business community, which was often
hostile to him, by fashioning the institutional underpinnings of the advanced capitalist
system of corporate-government interdependence, while on the other, contributed the
least by way of permanent institutional reform to the poor and the working people who
idolized him. This irony closely parallels that involved in the "judicial deradicaliza-
tion" of the Wagner Act described here. See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 115; H. WELLINGTON, LABOII AND THE
LEGAL PRocEss 88 (1968); Fleming, The Significance of the Wagner Act, in LABOR AND
THE NEW DEAL 135 (M. Derber & E. Young eds. 1957).
60. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv.
999, 1002 (1955). Cox writes more cautiously that Congress possibly intended, in pro.
mulgating the section 8(5) duty to bargain, that "the divine right of the king must yield
to a constitutional monarchy, in which a large measure of industrial democracy will
prevail. Wages, hours, and conditions of employment should be determined by mutual
consent." Cox, supra note 54, at 1408 (footnote omitted).
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jar with the principles of industrial democracy it is to be expected
that any autocratic conduct by an employer will come to be viewed
as a serious breach of the employees' rights to self-organization and
collective bargaining."
Enumerating the statutory premises in this manner makes ap-
parent why the Wagner Act was, at first, perceived by employers as
such a radical threat. Although it demands an effort of historical
imagination sufficient to penetrate the narcotic haze of hindsight to
understand this perception, the Act by its terms apparently accorded
a governmental blessing to powerful workers' organizations that were
to acquire equal bargaining power with corporations, accomplish a
redistribution of income, and subject the workplace to a regime of
participatory democracy. The Act's plain language was susceptible to
an overtly anticapitalist interpretation. 2
To corporate management, the Act was unquestionably the most
unpopular piece of New Deal legislation affecting industry.,, The bill
was denounced in vivid terms by representatives of a wide spectrum
of business interests, and most employers, large and small, opposed
its passage. 4 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle had called
61. Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLuht. L. Ray. 556, 599
(1945). Weyand's formulation suggests a fundamental ambiguity in the concept of
industrial democracy that is not resolved by the legislative history: is the contemplated
industrial democracy to be "participatory" or "representational"? As will be seen, the
subsequent development of the lak was directed almost entirely toward the latter
model, with only a passive role allowed rank-and-file employees in day.to.day in.
dustrial affairs.
62. Obviously such a radical reading of the Act is not compelled by the legislative
history. It does, however, find substantial support in that history and in the text of
the Act, see notes 50-61 supra and accompanying text; and moderate and conventional
interpretations of the Act, however more plausible they may seem now, cannot conclu-
sively be said to be commanded by-the legislative history either.
63. Of the major New Deal legislation included in a 1939 survey, the Wagner Act
was the least popular. By far the highest percentage of those surveyed, 43.9%, said the
Wagner Act was the worst of several listed New Deal reforms (although more respon-
dents demanded outright repeal of the undistributed profits tax (66.2%) than of the
Wagner Act (40.9%)). See What Business Thinks, FORTUNE, October 1939, at 52, 90.
See generally Wilcock, Industrial Management's Policies Toward Unionism, in LABOR
AND THE NE w DEAL, supra note 59, at 310.
64. When the Act was pending in Congress, representatives of the business com-
munity testified in opposition to it "in virtually solid phalanx." 1. BasrSN, supra
note 4, at 100. The National Association of Manufacturers undertook a campaign
described by a contemporary source as "the greatest ever conducted by industry re-
garding any Congressional measure." I. BERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 339. The press also
opposed the bill with near unanimity. See I. BERNsTrEu, supra note 4, at 89. Senator
Wagner received no assistance from President Roosevelt through most of the legislative
battles. The President "never lifted a finger," recalled Secretary of Labor Perkins, who
herself "had very little sympathy with the bill." W. LEUcHTFNBuRG, FRANKUN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE Naw DEAL, 1932-1940, at 150 n.23 (1963). Roosevelt belatedly
endorsed and supported the bill after it passed in the Senate. See id. at 151.
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Senator Wagner's predecessor bill, "one of the most objectionable, as
well as one of the most revolutionary, pieces of legislation ever pre-
sented to Congress, ' '1 5 while the Associated Industries of Oklahoma
thought the new bill would "out-soviET the Russian Soviets."" Nor
was opposition to the Act limited to verbal assaults. The business
community embarked upon a path of deliberate and concerted diso-
bedience to the Act between 1935 and 1937,11 a response marked by
65. Collective Bargaining and the American Federation of Labor, 138 Cost. &
FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 1975, 1976 (1934).
66. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOsEvELT: THE COMING OF TilE Nrw DEAL
405 (1959)(citing "a clipping from an Oklahoma City paper, Apr. 19, 1934"). This was
a period of increasing estrangement between Roosevelt and the business community,
during which both he and the government were widely perceived as moving rapidly to
the left and as tampering with the fundamentals of the American economic system:
free enterprise and private ownership of property. The Wagner Act debate roughly
coincided with consideration of the Administration's so-called "soak-the-rich" tax
plan and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 803
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970)), which produced a torrent of business
criticism. See E. HAWLEY, supra note 58, at 154-56. The irony of this development is
that the business opponents of the Administration misconstrued President Roosevelt's
rhetoric and political direction, indeed, that they attacked him when in a sense they
ought to have been his allies. See P. CONKIN, supra note 3, at 71-81; note 58 supra.
67. The overwhelming bulk of the National Labor Relations Board's efforts and
limited resources during these years was devoted to defending the constitutionality of
the Act and to combatting employers' legal harassment of Board operations. Employer
representatives coordinated their attacks at least to the extent of widespread exchange
of form pleadings and memoranda, and within a year after passage of the Act, the
Board was defending 83 injunction proceedings brought to restrain its operations.
Another aspect of this campaign of opposition was the "anticipatory nullification" of
the Act: prominent counsel retained by employers' spokespersons opined that the Act
was unconstitutional, and employers thereupon refused to obey it. The leading exam-
ple of this tactic was the American Liberty League's issuance on September 5, 1935.
before the Board had even completed its initial organization or published its first rules
and regulations, of a legal memorandum declaring the Act unconstitutional; the wide
circulation of this document seriously impeded efforts to enforce the Act. During its
first two years of operation, the Board issued 95 cease-and-desist orders against em-
ployers. These cases were carefully investigated and prepared because of the likelihood
of close appellate scrutiny; yet in only four cases did the Board succeed in securing
employer compliance with its order. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 349, 450, 639,
646-48; H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TA-r-HARTnEY 35-40 (1950);
Wilcock, supra note 63, at 290-91.
It should be noted that many unfair labor practice cases were settled "informally"
by voluntary compliance or withdrawal of the charge. The significance of these disposi-
tions must be depreciated, however, in view of the pressures toward settlement placed
on the Board by the overriding need to ensure that the inevitable constitutional test
would arise in the context of an important and clear-cut violation. See H. MILLIS & E.
BROWN, supra.
Even when the constitutional hurdle had been passed, the opposition of employers
to the Act did not cease. Rather, "it was redirected to Congress to demand amend-
ments to the Wagner Act and to deny adequate appropriations to the NLRB. The
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determination and often by violence. Large and respected corporate
employers engaged vast resources in systematic and typically unlaw-
ful antiunion campaigns involving such tactics as company unionism,
propaganda, espionage, surveillance, weapons stockpiling, lockouts,
pooling agreements for the supply of strikebreakers, and terrorism.'
What provoked this extraordinary campaign of lawlessness and
opposition to the statute? It is difficult to say with certainty whether
the dominant motive was simply opposition to the Act's promotion
of unionism and redistribution of bargaining power or a more funda-
mental fear that the Act was a prelude to state regulation of the
substantive terms of the wage-bargain and the loss of management's
exclusive right to direct the production process. From the available
evidence, however, it is at least possible to conclude that, in addition
to the purely economic costs of collective bargaining, business opposi-
tion to the Act was in significant measure prompted by two funda-
mental considerations. First, the Act's radical potential justifiably
produced a fear that collective bargaining meant the loss of control
over the production process, the fatal subversion of the hallowed right
of managerial freedom to run the enterprise. In short, business took
the Act's rhetoric of industrial democracy seriously." This common
Board sustained a propaganda onslaught, in which the press joined ferociously, that
was without historic precedent among federal agencies." I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7,
at 648.
68. According to the La Follette Subcommittee, the General Motors Company
operated "the most colossal supersystem of spies yet devised in any American corpora-
tion." I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 517. Every plant manager in the GM corporate
system employed detectives, and GM spent nearly a million dollars on labor spies
between January 1934 and June 1936 alone. See id. at 516-17. The Ford Motor Com-
pany openly employed thugs to assault union organizers, see id. at 569-71, and the
Republic Steel Corporation maintained a private police force of 370 men armed with
pistols, rifles, shotguns, gas grenades, billies, and other weapons. In May 1937, Repub-
lic spent almost $50,000 on munitions, stockpiled in preparation for a strike that it
forced prematurely, in part by use of a lockout. Republic's police force was better
stocked with gas weapons and gas munitions than any law enforcement agency, local.
state, or federal. The company also employed large espionage and propaganda opera-
tions. See Proposed Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings
Before the [La Follette] Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor.
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1939), quoted in R. BoYER & H. MoRAis, LABOR'S URrouD
STORY 315 (3d ed. 1970); I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 482-83.
For a description of the so-called "Mohawk Valley Formula," a widely touted.
comprehensive system for busting unions that involved a variety of propaganda tech-
niques, creation of puppet employee associations to lead "back-to-work" movements.
and the use of large, intimidating armed forces of loyal local and state police and
vigilantes, see Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626, 664-66 (1937).
69. See Wilcock, supra note 63, at 280, 311 (reference to mass production indus-
try):
The mere belief that unionism means or would mean the loss of some of
management's authority and prestige is a sufficient explanation for much of
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denominator of fear of loss of managerial control runs through much
of business' perceptions of the Act.70 Business was particularly out-
raged because the statute went beyond merely legalizing union activ-
ity and providing for representation elections, but in addition created
an affirmative duty on the part of employers to bargain with the
employees' exclusive representative over terms and conditions of
employment.7' This requirement raised the spectre that section 8(5)7
could lead to administrative scrutiny of the substantive terms of
employment contracts, indeed, to compulsory arbitration of the
terms of employment, and was viewed as a dramatic departure from
the concept of managerial control.7 3
The other motif prominent in expressions of business opposition
to the Act was the fear that the Act would encourage and promote
labor radicalism and class conflict as a necessary consequence of
promoting any kind of unionism." A Cleveland Chamber of Com-
management's opposition to unionism over the years ...
The available evidence indicates that during the New Deal period man-
agement's self-concept of its role in the economy and in society did not
permit it to change its basic philosophy and belief about unionism, namely
that unions would interfere with and compromise management's full and
rightful authority to manage.
70. It was, for example, central to General Motors' pre-1937 determination to
crush unionism in company plants. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 515-16.
71. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1970).
72. Section 8(5) of the Wagner Act made it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." Id. § 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
73. See Smith, supra note 32, at 1065-67, and sources cited therein. It is impor-
tant to recognize that, as a matter of history, there was no clear national policy or
consensus by 1935 indicating that private-ordering was always, or even ordinarily, the
preferred method of government regulation of the wage-bargain, assuming that regula-
tion was deemed appropriate at all. Several prior experiments in the regulation of labor
bargaining, such as the activities of the War Labor Board during World War I and the
Railroad Labor Board under the Transportation Act, 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, stressed
an adjudicatory model, as opposed to a bargaining or private-ordering model. Smith's
review indicates that subsequent enactments and administrative experience prior to
the Wagner Act failed to clarify the meaning of the "duty to bargain" concept, particu-
larly in regard to whether it implied primarily a procedural or a substantive model.
,Smith concludes that it cannot be clearly determined whether or not Congress in-
tended the NLRB to engage in substantive scrutiny of employer proposals in the course
of its administration of section 8(5); Congress simply did not think the problem
through. See Smith, supra note 32, at 1107.
74. Somewhere in the testimony of almost every industry representa-
tive during the course of the hearings on the Wagner Act is to be found the
thesis that a major defect in the bill was its premise that the relationship
between employer and employee was one of conflict rather than coopera-
tion. . . . The growth of a strong national union movement meant union
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merce resolution of the era, for example, expressed concern about
"'professional labor agitators whose primary objective is to foment
antagoism, with a view to an organized power, socially, politically
and economically dangerous to the American Commonwealth.' ", In
fact, business had good reason to fear that the Act would lead, at least
in the short run, to labor conflict and, therefore, in the context of the
times, to the possibility of increased working-class militancy and
political radicalism. As the sponsors of the Act themselves must have
foreseen, their rhetoric of industrial peace notwithstanding, the inevi-
table short-run impact of the Act would be a substantial increase in
strikes.7
It is even more difficult accurately to specify working people's
perceptions of, and attitudes toward, the Wagner Act. Conventional
labor historiography has tended to equate the aspirations and goals
of working people with those of the leadership of organized labor and,
apart from the well-known rivalry between the AFL and the CIO over
the craft versus industrial models of unionization, has assumed wide-
spread consensus among working people as to what was desired: legal
protection of the right to organize; equalization of bargaining power
by-and to the extent of-promoting unions as units of countervail-
ing economic power; use of this power to achieve higher standards of
living through wage-bargaining; and an industrial democracy limited
to the notion that the bargaining unit is a political constituency to
which should be extended the traditional democratic right to vote for
or against representation, btit that democratic participation is largely
exhausted by that choice. From this perspective, it follows that the
Wagner Act embodied the highest aspirations of labor and that its
passage and success not only marked the irreversible emergence of
labor as a political force in American life, but was triumphant testi-
mony to the possibilities of democratic reform within the framework
of capitalism.
domination such as many industrialists believed to exist in England at the
time.
Fleming, supra note 59, at 142. See also I. BERNsrmEN, supra note 7, at 515 (quoting
Alfred P. Sloan, President of General Motors, on the threat of labor radicalism).
Business rhetoric was sometimes quite exaggerated. Alfred P. Sloan. President of
General Motors during the 1930's, described the Flint auto sit-down strike as an at-
tempt "to Sovietize" the automobile industry and as "a dress rehearsal for Sovietizing
the entire country." R. BoYER & H. MoRms, supra note 68, at 303.
75. Fleming, supra note 59, at 143 (quoting the resolution).
76. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., I. BERNSTE, supra note 7; Green, Working Class Militancy in the
Depression, RA=IAL AM CA, November-December 1972. at 1. Irving Bernstein's work.
relied upon throughout this Article, exemplifies the assumptions of the conventional
historiography of the period and is one of the finest achievements of this genre.
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Recent reexaminations of the American labor history of the
1930's suggest, however, that, whereas the foregoing goals may have
reflected the attitudes of union leadership, a vastly more complicated
and variegated situation is revealed beneath the plane of articulate
historical actors at the level of ordinary, historically anonymous,
working people.7" The conventional view exaggerates the unitary
character of what labor sought generally in the 1930's and particu-
larly from the collective bargaining law. It appears that the leader-
ship of labor was in many respects quite distant from the rank and
file and often acted at cross-purposes to its desires. There is evidence
to support the claim that the collective bargaining model that even-
tually prevailed in the United States may not accurately reflect the
aspirations of at least a significant number of those who were foot-
soldiers in the industrial battles of the New Deal era. Rather, these
working people may have contemplated a far more radical restructur-
ing of relationships within the workplace in which industrial democ-
racy, as an ongoing, participatory process both in the factory and the
union, was at least as important as improved living standards. From
this perspective, working people fought with determination to make
the Act a reality-many giving their lives-because it imported more
to them than the right to engage in endless economic combat for
whatever benefits could be wrung from their corporate adversaries;
it meant a commitment of government assistance toward the achieve-
ment of an objectively decent living standard and some control over
the industrial decisions that affected their lives. At the very least, it
can be asserted that the Act meant many different things to different
people and groups on the labor side and that, for a substantial num-
ber, although they may have had only a vague idea of what the
statute actually said, it nevertheless symbolized a significant opening
in the direction of radical change. 9
78. See, e.g., J. BRECHER, supra note 9; A. LYND & S. LYND, RANK AND FILE:
PERSONAL HISTORIES BY WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZERS (1973); Green, supra note 77, and
sources cited therein; Lynd, supra note 53; Lynd, The Possibility of Radicalism in the
Early 1930's: The Case of Steel, RADICAL AMERICA, November-December 1972, at 37.
This new research was stimulated in part by developments in the field of European
social history exemplified by the work of Christopher Hill, E.J. Hobsbawm. George
Rud6, and E.P. Thompson.
79. The evidence on which these claims typically are based comes in part from
oral histories given by participants in the events of the 1930's and in part from a fresh
review of the record of working-class action. See generally sources cited in note 78
supra. Key points often made in support of the new viewpoint are that (1) the sit-
down strikes-particularly in rubber and auto-resulted from spontaneous militancy
on the part of the rank and file, who often acted against union advice and received
only reluctant and belated support from the leadership of the CIO; (2) many crucial
strikes were precipitated by issues concerning control of the work-process (e.g.. the
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An important conclusion emerges from the foregoing discussion:
the indeterminacy of the text and legislative history of the Act, the
political circumstances surrounding its passage, the complexity and
fluidity of working-class attitudes toward collective bargaining and
labor law reform during the period, and the hostility and disobedi-
ence of the business community make it clear that there was no
coherent or agreed-upon fund of ideas or principles available as a
conclusive guide in interpreting the Act. The statute was a texture
of openness and divergency, not a crystallization of consensus or a
signpost indicating a solitary direction for future development. This
situation presented first the Board and the lower courts, but ulti-
mately the United States Supreme Court, with the task of plotting
the contours of the nation's new labor law. In doing so, the Court had
speed of the assembly line; work-discipline) rather than wage issues; (3) militant
rank-and-file groups often expressed disillusionment during the period with both the
CIO leadership and the government, and they expressed a perspective of reliance on
their own concerted activity as the primary resource for achieving reform; (4) the
positive and often leading role played by left-wing activists (Communists. Trotskyists,
and others) has been distorted and underplayed in conventional historiography; and.
the most problematical claim, (5) the conduct of workers during the sit-downs-
particularly their efforts to create collective forms of social life during the building
occupations-intimates a yearning for, and the possibility of, a democratic reorgani-
zation of the workplace on the basis of a workers' control model. By contrast, it is
argued, CIO leaders moved swiftly after union recognition to suppress the more spon-
taneous and participatory expressions of working-class militancy so as to be able to
present themselves to management as competent guarantors of labor discipline.
Although this new labor history adds an important dimension to our understand-
ing of the era, as with corporate liberalism theory, it is important to maintain a critical
distance. Even accepting the claims of the new histories, it remains to be explained
why collective bargaining was almost universally and uncritically viewed by working-
class activists, both within and outside of the organized left-wing groups, as the corner-
stone of all programs for social justice and why, in contrast, the concept of workers'
control as such, and workers' councils, public ownership, state planning or decentral-
ized planning, and direct state regulation of the terms and conditions of employment
never became dominant rallying cries. Numerous explanations may be suggested why
stronger, more overtly socialist tendencies did not emerge, including the pressure of
circumstances for the satisfaction of immediate needs; the traditional conservatism of
American labor leaders; the fatal dependency of the labor movement on the federal
government, particularly after the Little Steel and Ford disasters of 1937; the stabiliz-
ing role played by the Communist Party in the context of its Popular Front politics;
and the growing understanding and exploitation by corporate executives of the co-
optative potential of collective bargaining. The argument of this Article is that the law
itself, as a legitimating ideology and a system of institutions, played a role in the
deradicalizing process.
Regardless of the strength of these explanations, however, the new labor history
provides convincing support for the proposition that the possibilities of, and support
for, working-class radicalism going beyond the quest for reforms within the boundaries
of capitalism existed during the 1930's to a far greater degree than is customarily
supposed.
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to select one set of principles from among the Wagner Act's possible
meanings and give to it the imprimatur of law. This task was una-
voidably a political enterprise that thrust the Court into a central role
in shaping the ideological and institutional architecture of the mod-
em capitalist workplace.
Of course, the Court was not presented with treatises on political
philosophy or industrial sociology in the argument of cases nor was
it asked to write such treatises in its decisions. The Court decided
issues of law in particular cases. Yet in many cases, the Court easily
could have reached one or more alternative results, while employing
accepted, competent, and traditional modes of judicial analysis and
remaining well within the boundaries of the legislative history of the
Act. In a number of cases, the Court overruled decisions of the Board
that were fully "responsible" in any traditional sense of appropriate
legal discourse ° and thereby pushed the law in a markedly different
political direction. To justify not one result, but the entire set of
results, the Court was obliged to articulate a new legal consciousness
respecting labor matters, a new intellectual outlook on the nature of
the wage-bargain. As this world view matured, it began to set bound-
aries on the type of questions the Court would ask and the possible
scope of results it could reach in the labor field; that is, future deci-
sions were mediated through, and in part determined by, the new
legal consciousness. At a certain point, this mediation of legal con-
sciousness may explain particular results in particular cases, where
the mere logic of precedent or legislative history, on the one hand, or
political result-orientation, on the other, are unable to do so. Though
it changed and adapted throughout the postwar period," ' the outlines
of the Court's modern outlook on labor issues were established in the
crucible of the late 1930's. To the extent that the vision of the law is
a form of legitimating ideology supportive and protective of the insti-
tutional structure of the workplace, this vision itself serves as a form
of political domination. 2
The remainder of this Article will attempt to demonstrate that,
in shaping the nation's labor law, the Court embraced those aims of
the Act most consistent with the assumptions of liberal capitalism
and foreclosed those potential paths of development most threatening
to the established order. Thus, the Wagner Act's goals of industrial
80. See, e.g., Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, rev'd, 98 F.2d 375
(7th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Sands Mfg. Co., I N.L.R.B. 546 (1936),
enforcement denied, 96 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
81. See note 278 infra.
82. The theory of the mediating role of legal consciousness, as an explanation of
judicial action distinct from both formalism and instrumentalism, owes much to the
work of Duncan Kennedy. See generally D. Kennedy, note 43 supra.
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peace, collective bargaining as therapy, a safely cabined worker free
choice, and some rearrangement of relative bargaining power sur-
vived judicial construction of the Act, whereas the goals of redistribu-
tion, equality of bargaining power, and industrial democ-
racy-although abiding in rhetoric-were jettisoned as serious com-
ponents of national labor policy.8 This process will be discussed in
terms of three central aspects of the Court's deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and articulation of a more modern legal consciousness:
its emphasis on contractualism; its development of the "public right"
doctrine; and its promulgation of certain limitations on the legal
protection of employee concerted activity.
Ill. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE WAGNER ACT:
FROM THE SIT-DOWNS TO PEARL HARBOR9'
A. THE CONTRACTUALIST PHOENIX: THE LABOR LAW REVOLUTION
As THE REvivAL OF Lochner v. New York"
In 1931, Walton Hamilton argued that the days of "freedom of
contract" were numbered." When the Wagner Act was passed, com-
mentators and courts saw in it the fulfillment of this prophecy with
respect to labor contracts. Indeed, it is widely believed today that
the Wagner Act effected a detachment of labor relations from the law
of contracts that had previously governed it." This notion is seriously
83. "[The section 7 rights of employees] are protected not for their own sake
but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife .... "
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50.
62 (1975).
84. For purposes of the following discussion, it is unnecessary to include updating
references to changes in the law since the period under discussion. Obviously, these
changes are substantial and many statements of law made in the following pages have
been superseded or qualified by later developments. The effort here is to reconstruct
the internal structure of the legal thought of the period in order to demonstrate its
ideological and institutional role and to determine whether the internalized political
vision of the labor movement changed in partial response to its changing legal environ-
ment.
85. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
86. See Hamilton, Freedom of Contract, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE- SOCIAL
SciENcEs 450, 454 (1931).
87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d 611, affd on rehearing,
92 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Smith, supra note 32, at 1065-
67, and sources cited therein.
88. This detachment is often seen as reflecting a broader trend toward the gen-
eral atrophy of contract law.
The most dramatic changes touching the significance of contract law in
modern life ... came about, not through internal developments in contract
law, but through developments in public policy which systematically robbed
contract of its subject-matter. Some of the best known of these developments
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misleading. Contract is alive and well in the law of labor relations."9
To be sure, the collective bargaining agreement is a special kind of
contract, with peculiar legal incidents,0 but despite the strongly anti-
contractualist overtones of the Act' the Supreme Court ensured from
have been mentioned-labor law, antitrust law, insurance law, business
regulation, and social welfare legislation. The growth of these specialized
bodies of public policy removed from "contract" (in the sense of abstract
relationships) transactions and situations formerly governed by it,
L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcT LAW IN AMERICA 24 (1965). See also G. GILMORE, Tim DEATh
OF CoNTRACr (1974).
89. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (Black, J.) ("One of
these fundamental policies [of the Act] is freedom of contract.").
90. For example, the collective bargaining contract is subject to certain special
canons of interpretation designed to effectuate substantive federal labor policy. See
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967)(complex entry barriers to individual employee's suit on collective bargaining
contract fashioned to protect arbitral process pursuant to federal labor policy); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal courts commissioned to
fashion a substantive law of the collective bargaining agreement based on federal labor
policy under the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1970)).
It has been persuasively argued that the distinctive features of the collective
bargaining contract have been so far elaborated that it may appropriately be said that
it is not a contract at all in the traditional sense, but a "charter" or "code" establishing
a system of private law for governing, and an adjudicatory mechanism for resolving,
disputes within the workplace; that is, that the "contractual" analysis of the collective
bargaining agreement must now be superseded by a "governmental function" concep-
tion. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 663 (1973).
Professor Feller's "institutional" argument, even if fully accepted, does not rebut
the position advanced here concerning the reincarnation and vitality of contractualism
in the Wagner Act cases (with the resulting regressive political impact). Feller's pri-
mary point is that contractual rights do not vest in individual employees under a
collective bargaining agreement, but even in his view the collective agreement is a
contract between the employer and the union. See id. at 792-805. Thus, Feller's theory
contains an irreducible contractualist core. See id. at 802-03, 853-54. There could not
be a more explicit statement of the authoritarian character of the workplace than his.
See id. at 737-38. Compare Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect
of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. Rs'. 731 (1950). See also Lynd, The Right to
Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975); M.
Rauch, Individual Rights Under a Labor Agreement: Doctrine and Theory During the
Interwar Period (1975)(unpublished paper on file at MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW). In sum,
the development of the governmental function conception of the collective bargaining
agreement represents not the demise or death of contract, but the emergence of a new
conception of contract law appropriate to the complexity of postwar corporate capital-
ism. See notes 154-84 infra and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(3), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3)(1970) (impinging upon the right of employers to choose their employees); id.
§ 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (creating a duty to bargain exclusively with union selected
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the start that contractualism would be the jurisprudential framework
of the law of labor relations . 2
The political ramifications of the Court's revivification of labor
contractualism at the moment of its apparent demise can be seen
from an analysis of the philosophy or ethos of freedom of contract.
Although contrary emphases on social control had never been ex-
cluded from the law of contracts," in the nineteenth century, freedom
of contract doctrine reshaped and revised that law so as to provide a
framework for protecting expectations and facilitating transactions
deemed essential or desirable from the standpoint of the emerging
capitalist order." In the spirit of laissez faire, the doctrine extolled
the social virtue of uncompelled private-ordering of most transac-
tions: the right of private citizens to establish the legal incidents and
standards governing most of their relationships. 5 The central moral
ideal of contractualism was and is that justice consists in enforcing
the agreement of the parties so long as they have capacity and have
had a proper opportunity to bargain for terms satisfactory to each.
Contractual justice is, therefore, formal and abstract: within the
broad scope of legal bargains it is disinterested in the substantive
content of the parties' arrangements."
by a majority of employees). Moreover, if the duty to bargain were, as once feared, to
be interpreted as requiring the making of objectively reasonable proposals and counter-
proposals, it threatened to involve the state directly in the determination of terms
and conditions of employment, see notes 53-73 supra and accompanying text, a mani-
fest threat to traditional contractualist notions.
92. See notes 103-53 infra and accompanying text.
93. See F. KrssLER & G. GiLMoRE; CoNTRAcTs 1-15 (2d ed. 1970).
94. On the connection between the appearance of modern contract law and the
rise of capitalism, see M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFonIAION OF AimmucA LAw 1780-1860.
ch. 6 (1977); F. KEssLEa & G. GI.MoRE, supra note 93, at 1-15; Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLui L. Rav. 629 (1943);
Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. 50
PASr & PaEsnEr 76 (1971).
95. The underlying philosophical assumptions of the freedom of contract doc.
trine parallel those that characterize the classical liberal political tradition, see note
38 supra and accompanying text; namely, that all values are arbitrary, subjective, and
personal; that society is an artificial aggregation of autonomous individuals who come
together solely for the instrumental purpose of maximizing personal satisfactions; that
the state should do no more than facilitate the orderly quest for such satisfactions; and
that, because values are arbitrary and subjective, only the concurrence, actual or
constructive, of individual desires can provide standards of ethical obligation. See M.
Hoawrrz, supra note 94, at 161.
96. It is, of course, commonplace that many traditional contract doctrines, such
as capacity, duress; undue influence, and unconscionability, allow or even invite
judges to inquire into the substantive terms of a contract. Indeed, it is well known that
judges do so anyway in the course of applying doctrines intended precisely to disallow
such inquiry, although ordinarily such substantive scrutiny cannot be accomplished
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Since its appearance a century or more ago, the moral and social
policy of freedom of contract has been assailed by critics who regard
as its chief vice the fact that the substantive content of private-
ordering reflects the gross disparities of economic power characteris-
tic of capitalist society. 7 In this view, freedom of contract is, in prac-
tice, an institutional framework for the legitimate exercise of coercive
power." The amount of freedom created by the system of freedom of
contract depends on the structure of economic power,99 yet differences
of economic or class power are ordinarily either ignored or regarded
as legitimate in contractualist jurisprudence, particularly in its late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conceptualist version.'00 The
explicitly without subverting the prevailing rules of law. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment
1; I. MACNEIL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACrS 279-81 (1971); Kessler, supra note
94, at 633. Nonetheless, the animating ideology of contractualism urges courts to
regard as morally irrelevant the substantive terms of a contract, and historically this
has often led to 9ppressive results.
The disjunction of form and substance in modem contract law is exemplified with
exceptional clarity in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (Black, J.).
97. Contractualism has also been criticized by questioning the validity of its
underlying metaphysical assumptions. Thus, in contrast to the liberal political tradi-
tion, it has been argued that the good is not arbitrary and wholly subjective; that needs
and values can arise from shared social experience apart from mere coincidence or
situations of domination; that there is a natural, spontaneous component of human
sociality; that public and private life are indissolubly linked; that the ideal of com-
munity is a meaningful and worthy starting point for political philosophy; and that
justice properly has a substantive meaning. Each of these themes has been advanced
by major dissenting intellectual traditions in liberal society, located at a variety of
positions on the political spectrum; they are reflected in the Marxist tradition from
which this paper draws its inspiration. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS
(1975).
98. The system of "free" contract described by nineteenth century
theory is now coming to be recognized as a world of fantasy . . . . As wel-
come fiction is slowly displaced by sober fact, the regime of "freedom" can
be visualized as merely another system, more elaborate and more highly
organized, for the exercise of economic pressure.
Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, I TUL.
L. REV. 345, 345 (1937). See also Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
99. See Weber, Freedom and Coercion, in ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOcIErY 188.
91 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
100. An extraordinarily powerful statement of this view has been rendered by the
Supreme Court:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will
be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negoti-
ating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. ...
[Ijt is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as
legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
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tendency of freedom of contract doctrine has been to treat as natu-
rally preordained an historically contingent system of class relations.
In the context of the labor market, freedom of contract produced
oppressive and morally defective results for two reasons. First, the
wage-bargain is inherently an unequal exchange, because the value
produced by the employee, and appropriated by the capitalist, must
ordinarily be greater than the value received back in wages. 10' Second,
the wage contract is more than a legal relationship. It establishes an
entire system of social relations in the workplace whereby the em-
ployer is entitled to control the worker's actions and choices during
the major portion of his waking hours. Thus, labor contractualism
functions as the institutional basis of domination in the workplace.'"
Private-ordering in the labor market therefore means, for the ordi-
nary American worker, only the freedom to choose one capitalist or
another to whom to sell one's labor power. It offers no freedom to opt
out of the social relations of capitalism, to participate as a subject in
defining the quality of work or of life. It is for this reason that
101. This is the essence of Marx's theory of surplus value. See 1 K. MARX,
CAPrAL 270-306 (Fowkes trans. 1976). See also G. Young, Justice and Capitalist Pro.
duction: Marx and Bourgeois Ideology (May 28, 1977) (unpublished paper presented
to the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, Madison, Wisconsin). In my view, this
theory remains sound, notwithstanding persuasive criticisms that have challenged the
continuing validity of some of Marx's other economic ideas, and the fact that, with
the rise of labor unions, the disparity between capital and labor may be somewhat
abated.
102. In their capacity as commodity traders, all participants [in the
market], capitalists and workers, are free in the sense that they can sell to
anyone willing to buy, and buy from anyone willing to sell. This applies to
the worker's sale and the capitalist's purchase of labour-power just as much
as it applies to transactions in any other commodity. As traders, capitalists
and workers participate equally .... [But, having] sold himself, the
worker must now work for the capitalist. In the labour-process he works
under the control of the capitalist, producing what the latter wants, submit-
ting to capitalist labour discipline and performing the kind of work the
capitalist desires.
Rowthorn, Neo-Classicism, Neo-Ricardianism, and Marxism, NEw Lasr Ra., July-
August 1974, at 63, 79-80. This point derives from Marx's theory of alienation, first
articulated in his early works, see generally K. MAnx, EARLY Wrris 279.400 (R.
Livingstone & G. Benton trans. 1975); K. MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHuLoSOPWC MANU-
scRIuPrs OF 1844 (M. Milligan trans. 1964), and developed throughout his mature work,
see generally K. MARx, supra note 101; K. MARX, GRuNDIssE (M. Nicolaus trans.
1973). Capitalist wage-labor for Marx, was not an expression of freedom and creativity,
but a veritable "'catastrophe of the human essence.'" Breines, Notes on Georg Lu-
kdcs' "The Old Culture and the New Culture," TELOs, Spring 1970, at 1, 13 (quoting
Marcuse, Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus, 9 DIE
GaEsauscH~sr 136 (1932)). Work continues to be an experience of domination and
dehumanization for most people in late capitalism. See generally H. BaavrnaIA,
LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPrrAL (1974).
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working-class movements have traditionally sought to curtail free-
dom of contract, through struggles to limit the hours of work, to set
minimum wages, or to restrict the employer's discretion in hiring and
firing.
The foremost task of the Supreme Court, in the wake of the
Wagner Act, was to resolve whether the wage-bargain would remain
fundamentally within the contractualist, private ordering framework.
This task was accomplished in the very first cases decided under the
Act. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'"3 and its companion
cases"0' are chiefly remembered for their far-reaching innovations
in the areas of federalism, the commerce power, and the scope of
judicial review,"0 5 but this fact must not obscure their crucial histori-
cal role in updating and preserving the freedom of contract ideal.
Jones & Laughlin began by establishing that employees would
be allowed to pool their bargaining power to offset the superior eco-
nomic position of the employer and that the employer would not be
permitted to interfere with its employees' decision whether to adopt
a collective posture for wage-bargaining or their choice of a represent-
ative for that purpose.10 Chief Justice Hughes' conception appeared
to be that employees had a privilege to create a quasi-fiduciary or
protected economic relationship between each of them individually
and the others by constituting a collective bargaining unit and desig-
nating an "agent" or "agency" (a word commonly used to refer to
unions in the early opinions) to represent them.' 7 The designation of
the bargaining agency constituted the creation of the "protected"
relationship, and the unfair labor practices proscribed in section 8'"
were conceived essentially as torts of injurious interference with the
103. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
104. NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103 (1937); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25-32 (1937).
A number of subsequent labor cases raised the commerce power issue, but as a consti-
tutional question it rapidly became moot so far as the Wagner Act was concerned.
See NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23 (1941); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n,
310 U.S. 318 (1940); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453
(1938).
106. See 301 U.S. at 33-34.
107. See id.
108. Section 8 made it an unfair labor practice for an employer generally to
interfere with the rights of employees, to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of labor organizations, to discriminate against members of a labor
organization, or to refuse to bargain collectively. See National Labor Relations (Wag-
ner) Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(5) (1970).
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privileged relationship. 9 That is, employer interference with em-
ployee choice of a bargaining representative was treated conceptually
as similar to employee interference with the employer's protected
relationship with its representative, such as would occur, for exam-
ple, if an employee intercepted the employer's communications with
counsel:
[Legitimate] collective action would be a mockery if representation
were made futile by interference with freedom of choice. Hence the
prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of repre-
sentatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference between
employers and employees, "instead of being an invasion of the con-
stitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of the rights
of both.""10
But the Court emphatically rejected any suggestion that the Act
abolished private-ordering as the framework of relationships in the
workplace:
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and
employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not
prevent the employer "from refusing to make a collective contract
and hiring individuals on whatever terms" the employer "may by
unilateral action determine." . . . The Act does not interfere with
the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employ-
ees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that
right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-
organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the Board
is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with
the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons
than such intimidation and coercion."'
109. See 301 U.S. at 33-34.
110. Id. at 34 (quoting Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks,
281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930)). The "quasi-tort" conception of the unfair labor practice had
been previously articulated in the Railway Labor Act cases. See Virginian Ry. Co. v.
System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). The Court leans heavily on the authority of these
cases in Jones & Laughlin. The symmetry of Chief Justice Hughes' view was faintly
echoed in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments by the addition of rarely invoked sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B), which made it an unfair labor practice for labor organizations to re-
strain or coerce "an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." Labor Management Rela-
tions (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
111. 301 U.S. at 45-46 (citations omitted). Chief Justice Hughes' apparent belief
in the survival of the employer's right to enter individual contracts of employment
notwithstanding the duty to bargain collectively was clearly incongruent with the
statutory plan, as the Court soon made clear. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 678 (1944); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). It indicates, however, how
far the Court strained to preserve individualist contractualism. See Weyand, supra
note 61, at 568-69.
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In the Court's view, the Act did not infringe on normal manage-
rial prerogatives except insofar as the employer was prohibited from
invading the employees' privilege to pool their bargaining power and
to choose and act through a bargaining agent."' The Act was no
warrant for a regime of governmental supervision of normal manage-
rial decisions. The Court rejected any inference that the law would
inquire into the substantive justice of labor-management relations or
the fairness of the wage-bargain. In short, the opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes really went no further than the dissenting opinions in the
classical freedom of contract cases of Adair v. United States"' and
Coppage v. Kansas;"' his conceptual universe was akin to that which
inspired those opinions." 5
112. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937).
113. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
114. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Indeed, the Court in Jones & Laughlin claimed to distin-
guish Adair and Coppage, thereby avoiding the need to overrule them. See 301 U.S.
at 45.
115. The Court's adherence to traditional contractualist ideals was further evi-
denced by its unwillingness to detonate the explosive question of duress in the employ-
ment contract. The moral presuppositions of contract law logically compel the exist-
ence of a doctrine that contracts entered into under duress, where free-choice is over-
borne, are unenforceable. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. Rav. 253 (1947); Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of Free Will
Theory: A Proposed Tort Analysis, 53 IowA L. REV. 892 (1968). The problem with this
doctrine, and its companion, undue influence, as applied to the law of labor relations
is articulating boundaries to its application. In a world where survival is the dominant
motivation of employees in entering the wage-bargain, an expansive application of
these doctrines would undermine the contractualist, private-ordering structure of the
labor market because, as Dawson convincingly argues, the logic of the doctrine is to
invite scrutiny of the substantive fairness of the exchange. See Dawson, supra at 282-
90. This contradiction between the conceptual and logical necessity for a doctrine of
nonliability on account of duress and the imperatives of social and economic reality
has had a permanent existence in the law of labor contracts. Cf. Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 263-74 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)("[iif it is
coercion to threaten to strike unless [the employer] consents to a closed union shop,
it is coercion also to threaten not to give one employment unless the [employee] will
consent to a closed nonunion shop").
In Jones & Laughlin, Chief Justice Hughes refused to confront this contradiction.
He conceded that employees were disadvantaged in bargaining with employers:
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were
organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was
helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on
his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that if the em-
ployer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that
union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with
their employer.
301 U.S. at 33 (citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184 (1921)). Because of this disparity, employees would henceforth have a privi-
lege to pool their bargaining power.
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Subsequent cases of the period preserved this framework, with a
bloc composed of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts and
Stone continuing to adhere to contractualism and a conceptualist
style of analysis. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,',, for
example, the Court established the crucial strategic right of struck
employers to offer permanent positions to workers hired to replace
strikers (so long as the strike was not provoked or prolonged by unfair
labor practices).1 7 The manner in which the Court reached its conclu-
sion is instructive. The issue before the Court was whether, as a
matter of labor policy, the employer should have the weapon of per-
manent replacement at its disposal. The Court, however, never can-
didly addressed this question, saying only that it did not follow from
But having sanctioned this limited interference with the traditional model of
freedom of contract so as to make freedom of contract work, the Court left the parties
largely on their own. The concept of duress was not made available to challenge the
integrity of the wage-bargain so long as neither party violated the rules designed to
permit employees to bargain collectively. Even in those cases, the law would act only
to remedy a quasi-tortious interference with a privileged relationship, see notes 107-
10 supra and accompanying text, not a defect of contractualism itself. Any hint that
the Act might bar management from utilizing its vastly superior bargaining power in
labor negotiations was silenced. In this respect, labor law was not detached from the
law of contracts, but assimilated to itself the persistent antinomies of contractualism.
116. 304 U.S. 333 (1938)(Roberts, J.).
117. See id. at 345-46. The National Labor Relations Board did not challenge
this position, for reasons that are unclear. Rather, it focused on its claim that discrimi-
nation against union adherents in the process of reinstating or recalling employees at
the conclusion of an economic strike violated the Act. The former issue, however, was
clearly presented in the case.
The employer's theory in the lower court was that it had a constitutional, as well
as statutory, right to treat the employment relationship as voluntarily severed when
employees embarked upon an economic strike and that the Board's order seeking
reinstatement on account of an unfair labor practice occurring subsequent to the onset
of a strike invaded not only its protected liberty to decline to contract with "former"
employees, but also its freedom to maintain its contracts with permanent replace-
ments. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d 611, 627-29, affd on rehearing,
92 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 333 (1938). On rehearing, the court of
appeals adopted the view, as a matter of statutory construction, that the employer was
invulnerable to any charge of an unfair labor practice occurring at the end of an
economic strike because, at the outset, economic strikers lost the status of employees,
see 92 F.2d at 764-65; one judge took the view that the maximum right of economic
strikers was to be reinstated to the position of applicants for employment rather than
as employees, see id:
The Board's failure to argue that an offer of permanent placement to strikebreak-
ers is unlawful is surprising, since few other forms of employer conduct have a more
chilling effect on employee concerted activity. Moreover, it would have been a natural
argument to attempt to bring permanent replacement of strikers within the condemna-
tion of section 8(1), read in light of the strong admonition of section 13 that the Act
shall not be construed "so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike." National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
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section 13"11 "that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the
statute, [had] lost the right to protect and continue his business by
supplying places left vacant by strikers.""' 9 This statement is a para-
digmatic representation of the vices of conceptualist legal reasoning
because the question whether the employer was "guilty of [an] act
denounced by the statute" was precisely the matter to be decided,
and the question whether the employer had a right to protect his
business, if to do so would invade the right of his employees to engage
in concerted activity, likewise required explicit analysis from the
standpoint of the society's labor policy. In each case, the Court
merely assumed its conclusion, presenting as compelled by the words
of the Act, or by Reason, or simply as a priori true, judgments involv-
ing debatable choices from among competing economic and political
values. Thus, the conceptualist tradition was upheld and continued
as the Court masked the unavoidably ideological content of judicial
action. '2
The Mackay rule remains the prevailing law.'2' It is historically
important because it was one of the earliest manifestations of the
developing premise that once an employer lawfully bargains to im-
passe, it is free unilaterally to impose terms and conditions of em-
ployment, if it has the economic staying power to defeat a strike.'22
Thus, the decision furthered the principle that the Act is disinter-
118. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970)(pro-
tecting the right to strike).
119. 304 U.S. at 345.
120. The point is not that a realist analysis would have guaranteed a different
or better result in Mackay. An explicit sociopolitical analysis might have more can-
didly addressed the real issues involved, but ultimately a realist balancing of compot.
ing interests in light of Congress' labor policy might have led to the same result.
Neither conceptualism nor realism succeeds in immunizing adjudication from politics,
nor is either a method that provides a determinate answer to every legal problem.
The effort here is simply to delineate the texture and vision of the legal consciousness
developing in the cases under discussion.
121. But see NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (continuing
recall rights of economic strikers); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968) (continu-
ing recall rights of economic strikers), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
122. True, the union has no duty to yield on a so-called mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, and it can strike to win its demands if it has otherwise met its
duty to bargain in good faith under the 1947 amendments. But this does not negate
the superior bargaining and staying power that management typically enjoys over
labor, nor does it correct the imbalances contained in the law itself. For example,
employers are ordinarily free to make unilateral changes respecting nonmandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, whereas labor has no legal right to enforce its de-
mands as to such subjects. See generally Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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ested in the substantive justice of the labor contract since it taught
that not only would the wage-bargain not ordinarily be subject to
substantive scrutiny, but also that the economic combat of the par-
ties had replaced a "meeting of the minds" as the moral basis of labor
contractualism.
NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co.'2 was another example of
this trend. ' In Sands, a dispute arose between the union and the
employer during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. The
Court held that the statutory duty to bargain attached in such situa-
tions.12 The dispute in question remained unresolved after discus-
sion, however, and a work-stoppage was threatened. The company
thereupon discharged the entire work force and reopened the plant
with a wholly new complement of employees. It was contested
whether the initial dispute went to a question of contract application
or to a proposed modification; in any event, the union refused to
compromise its position. Interpreting the contract sua sponte, the
Court announced that its terms favored the employer's version and
that, therefore, the union was unilaterally insisting upon a midterm
modification.1 2 6 The Court held that employees may not use economic
123. 306.U.S. 332 (1939) (Roberts, J.).
124. See generally NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292, 297-98 (1939) (Stone, J.) (holding that an employer cannot be guilty of violating
section 8(5) unless a formal offer to bargain is tendered by employee representatives);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)(Hughes, C.J.) (preserving
through strained analysis the validity of contracts that, judging strictly from the facts
recited by the Court, were tainted by unfair labor practices); see also S. KoNrsKY,
CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPRME CoUrT 151-58 (1945).
The element of extreme formalism in the Columbian Enameling opinion stems
from the Court's refusal to accept a Board finding of fact that an offer to bar-
gain-relayed by federal conciliators on the scene-was indeed outstanding in this
case. Justice Stone, unimpressed by the Board's appraisal of the evidence, in effect
held that the employees had forfeited or waived their right to oblige the company to
bargain by having failed to meet a rather exacting standard of what constitutes an
offer. See 306 U.S. at 297-300. Justice Black's dissent was caustic:
To conclude that the company-through its president-was unaware
the conciliators were acting at the instance of the Union, and, therefore, is
not to be held responsible for its flat refusal to meet with its employees, is
both to ignore the record and to shut our eyes to the realities of the conditions
of modem industry and industrial strife. The atmosphere of a strike between
an employer and employees with whom the employer is familiar does not
evoke, and should not require, punctilious observance of legalistic formalities
and social exactness in discussions relative to the settlement of the
strike.... In a realistic view, the company's statement of July 23 to the
conciliators, that it would meet with them and the Union, clearly indicated
the company's acceptance of the fact that the conciliators were appearing
for the Union.
Id. at 303-04.
125. 306 U.S. at 342.
126. See id. at 340-45.
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power to impose their demands in such a situation, despite the fact
that the contract did not contain a "no-strike" clause and, in fact,
reserved full liberty of action to the employees in case of impasse in
attempts to resolve "misunderstandings" between the company and
the work force.' The employees' insistence that they would not work
except under their interpretation of the contract was held to be a
"breach" or "repudiation" of an implied contractual obligation, suffi-
cient to divest the workers of their statutory right to engage in con-
certed activity. The Court stated,
The Act does not prohibit an effective discharge for repudiation by
the employee of his agreement . . ..
If, as we have held, the respondent was confronted with a
concerted refusal on the part of [the union] to permit its members
to perform their contract there was nothing unlawful in the com-
pany's attempting to procure others to fill their places.'""
The Court's opinion in Sands relied on a highly formalistic and
contractualist reading of the statute to legitimize the inequalities of
bargaining power arising from the unequal social distribution of prop-
erty ownership.' 9 The ban on the use of economic power by the union
was, given the record presented, presumably meant to apply equally
to attempts to impose a union interpretation of an agreement as well
as to achieve a midterm modification of the agreement. That is, if an
impasse is reached, the employer could use its economic power,
namely its ownership and control of the business, to get its way, but
the workers could not use their primary economic weapon, the work-
stoppage.
The Court's initial period of contractualist formalism under the
Wagner Act was followed by a series of realist victories, written
chiefly by Justices Black and Douglas. One series of these cases con-
cerned the definition of "free choice," an essential ingredient of tradi-
tional contract doctrine, in the context of alleged employer domina-
tion of labor organizations.
The old-fashioned company union was one of the preeminent
127. See id. at 343. It is curious that Sands is no longer remembered in terms of
its actual facts, but rather is commonly assumed to reflect the case in which the union
has agreed to a no-strike clause. For example, one prominent casebook cites Sands for
the proposition that "although a strike during the term of a labor contract, in violation
of a no-strike clause, is not prohibited by the Labor Act, it is unprotected .... A.
Cox, D. BoK, & R. GORmAN, LABOR LAW 935-36 (8th ed. 1977).
In 1947 Congrees provided statutory guidelines relating to the midterm modifica-
tion problem with the addition of section 8(d)(1)-(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1)-(4) (1970).
128. 306 U.S. at 344-45.
129. See generally note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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weapons employers used to defeat the labor movement.' Therefore,
section 8(2) of the Act was a crucial battleground in the 1930's.13' If
the Act were to fulfill its functions, the company union had to be
eliminated. To this end, the Board and the courts developed the
remedy of "disestablishing" organizations found to be employer-
dominated.' The realists pushed this remedy to its limits. In NLRB
v. Falk Corp.,"' for example, one issue was whether the remedy of
"disestablishment" meant that the company union was to be denied
a place on the ballot in an election to choose a new bargaining repre-
sentative. Justice Black, writing for the Court, upheld the Board's
conclusion that the "company-created union could not emancipate
itself from habitual subservience to its creator, and that in order to
insure employees that complete freedom of choice guaranteed by
§ 7, [the dominated union] must be . . . kept off the ballot."'"' In
other words, if the workers voted for the company union in a fair
election, that would not be "free choice." This free choice had a
substantive content, determined by the history of the workplace, not
merely a formal content determined by the mechanics of secret bal-
loting. 3'
The realist tide swept away other formalistic doctrines. In NLRB
v. Waterman Steamship Co.,' Justice Black held that the formali-
130. See, e.g., L BERNSTEIN, supra note 34, ch. 3; I. BERNsTEIN, supra note 7,
passim; Wilcock, supra note 63, at 288, 296-97. After the Act became law many em-
ployers attempted to achieve similar results not by setting up company unions from
scratch, but by encouraging employees to form an independent and, inevitably,
employer-dominated union or by assisting the more conservative of two competing
unions to gain exclusive bargaining status. Typically this involved favoring the AFL
affiliate over the CIO affiliate. See generally id. at 305.
131. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970)
(unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with any labor organiza-
tion).
132. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S.
241, 251 (1939); NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272, 275 (1938);
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 263, 268 (1938).
133. 308 U.S. 453 (1940).
134. Id. at 461.
135. See also NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941); NLRB v. Bradford
Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940) (employees who had designated a CIO affiliate as
their bargaining agent and had switched, in the context of section 8(2) unfair labor
practices, to a company union could not revoke their earlier choice).
Link-Belt is perhaps the most extreme example of the realist position in the free
choice area. In that case, it was argued that the "dominated union" was, in fact, a
bona fide labor organization and that the unfair labor practices consisted only in the
employer's favoring it over another union. Accordingly, it was argued that full dis-
establishment would amount to the destruction of an innocent union due to the
wrongdoing of a third party. See 311 U.S. at 600. Justice Douglas rejected this argu-
ment, upholding the Board's position that the only way to protect "complete freedom
of choice" and to dissipate the effects of employer misconduct was completely to dis-
establish the favored union. See id.
136. 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
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ties of the typical seaman's contract, under which each voyage consti-
tutes a separate and distinct contractual relationship, were not con-
trolling under the Act.'37 The words of the Act were
not limited so as to outlaw discrimination only where there is in
existence a formal contract or relation of employment between em-
ployer and employee. They embrace, as well, all elements of the
employment relationship which in fact customarily attend employ-
ment and with respect to which an employer's discrimination may
as readily be the means of interfering with employees' right of self-
organization as if these elements were precise terms of a written
contract of employment .... For the purpose of the Act, it is imma-
terial that employment is at will and terminable at any time by
either party.'1
The Court held that, although the employer had a clear contractual
right to discharge his employees after a voyage for any reason what-
soever or no reason at all, it could not exercise that right in such a
way as to chill union activity.3 '
Similarly, in International Association of Machinists v. NLRB,"0
the Court developed a broad doctrine of "imputed liability" in order
to safeguard worker free choice."' The Court stated that the techni-
calities of respondeat superior were not applicable to proceedings
under the Act:
The employer, however, may be held to have assisted the forma-
tion of a union even though the acts of the so-called agents were not
expressly authorized or might not be attributable to him on strict
application of the rules of respondeat superior. . . .Thus, where the
employees would have just cause to believe that solicitors pro-
fessedly for a labor organization were acting for and on behalf of the
management, the Board would be justified in concluding that they
did not have the complete and unhampered freedom of choice which
the Act contemplates."2
Undoubtedly, the free choice decisions overrode certain tradi-
tional doctrines governing the employment contract, but they did not
attack contractualism as such. They sought to achieve what the
Court saw as the preconditions of "true" or "actual" private-
ordering; they were designed to make contractualism work, not to
abolish it. There is no intimation in these decisions that, once the
137. See id. at 218-19.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. 311 U.S. 72 (1940) (Douglas, J.).
141. See also NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941) (Douglas, J.); H. J,
Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941) (Stone, J.).
142. 311 U.S. at 80 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 62:265
WAGNER ACT
preconditions of "actual liberty of contract" were realized, the law
would inquire into the substantive results of bargaining. Thus, the
new realism preserved the formal and abstentionist posture of tradi-
tional contract doctrine,"' and the political function of labor contrac-
tualism-the creation of an institutional framework in which social
relations of domination appear in the guise of free exchange-was
reaffirmed.
Only the uncertain shadow of the section 8(5)'" duty to bargain
clouded this contractualist horizon. The legislative history of section
8(5) contains repeated indications that the Act was not intended to
require the parties to agree to anything, but just to meet and bar-
gain.' Nevertheless, it was clear from the pre-NLRA experience of
the National Labor Board and the "old" National Labor Relations
Board under section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act,"'
that the duty to bargain would have to mean more, if it were to mean
anything, than just a minimal duty physically to meet with employee
representatives. The Board and the courts, however, largely avoided
setting the parameters of the duty during the period under discus-
sion, because the primary battleground of the 1930's was the field of
union organization and recognition, not collective bargaining as
such."'47
143. An interesting illustration of residual contractualism is the case of National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940), which held that the Board has the power
under section 10(c) to set aside contracts that are the fruit of unfair labor practices
and that contractual agreements cannot waive or defeat essential rights under the Act.
This represented a very severe stance toward employer domination. Yet what the
remedy meant in practice was left totally unclear since it was left open to the employ-
ees to sue on the tainted contract even though the employer was barred from taking
any benefit from it. That is, although the contract was so tainted by illegality as to
render ordinary enforcement against public policy, it was still sometimes a contract
vis-a-vis the employees.
144. The text of section 8(5) appears in note 72 supra.
145. See, e.g., 79 CoNG. REc. 7659 (1935). Section 8(d), which explicitly pro-
vides that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession," was not added until 1947. Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 101(8)(d), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970)).
146. Ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (protecting the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively). The National Industrial Recovery Act was held
unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
147. [T]he courts so far . . . have for the most part approved the
present Labor Board's statements of principle which might logically be said
to imply a testing of the reasonableness of the employer's arguments and
proposals . . . [but they] have so far largely shied away from a deliberate
approval of such a testing process, perhaps because the board has done
likewise.
Smith, supra note 32, at 1105-06.
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In the period before Pearl Harbor, the only major Supreme Court
decision under section 8(5) was H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,"5 which
held that, although an employer was not compelled to agree to a
union's demands, if the parties did reach an agreement, the section
8(5) duty required the employer, on request, to incorporate the agreed
terms into a written, signed document.'49 It was logically possible to
imply from Heinz a power in the Board to scrutinize employers' bar-
gaining conduct against a standard of objectively reasonable bargain-
ing practice, but the Court's actual reasoning supplied no basis for
anticipating that the Board would be empowered to judge bargaining
conduct, much less the content of proposals, under a broad reasona-
bleness standard.5 0 Rather, the Heinz rule was understood at the
time as a minimal imposition designed to stabilize and regularize the
collective bargaining relationship, as part of the program to make
contractualism work. Thus, although the Court's pronouncements in
this area were minimal, it is nevertheless apparent, given that sub-
stantive scrutiny was at least a plausible outcome in light of the
legislative history, that the Court's preference for purely procedural
review represented a matter of conscious choice.''
148. 311 U.S. 514 (1941)(Stone, J.).
149. See id. at 523-26.
150. The argument for such a reading would be as follows: because in Heinz the
company complied in all other respects with its duty to bargain (i.e., since there was
no evidence of bad faith or surface bargaining in a subjective sense, save what was
supplied by the refusal to sign a document, see id. at 523), the Court must have
adopted a reasonableness test under which certain practices would be deemed without
more to constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith. This argument gains weight from
the Court's substantial reliance on the fact that written contracts are the accepted
practice where mature collective bargaining prevails. See id. at 523-25.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the Court indicated at one
point that the company's refusal to join in a signed writing was properly deemed by
the Board as evidence of want of good faith in a subjective sense, see id. at 526; that
is, the Court simply was not clear about whether the refusal to sign was taken as cir-
cumstantial evidence of state of mind or as objectively unreasonable conduct. Second,
the context and phrasing of the references to accepted industrial practice indicate
that they were offered as evidence that Congress specifically had addressed itself to
this particular form of bargaining conduct and intended that the written contract rule
attach to the duty to bargain, see id. at 524-25; this presentation of the argument is
somewhat different from saying that the Board was free to judge any category of bar.
gaining behavior against the accepted industrial practice respecting such conduct.
Finally, the Court's opinion explicitly reaffirmed that the statute imposes no obliga-
tion on employers to reach any agreement. See id. at 525.
151. The foregoing discussion is not a legal argument that the Board should have
been granted the power of substantive scrutiny over wage-bargaining. Nor is it con-
tended that substantive review of the wage-bargain would have been the answer to
labor's problems or a guarantee of justice for the American worker. From a theoretical
standpoint, the idea of a democratic process establishing what the community regards
as fair and just terms of employment is attractive compared to leaving such decisions
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The rudimentary foundations of a new jurisprudential synthesis,
"social conceptualism," began to appear on two levels in the process
of development of the new labor contractualism. On a substantive
level, the Court recognized that state regulation of the wage-bargain
could coexist with private-ordering. This outlook at once affirmed
two seemingly contradictory social values: that it is appropriate and
just for the state to rearrange the relative bargaining strengths of
capital and labor because the pre-existing disparity of power pro-
duced substantively unacceptable results and that the state ought
not to intervene in private wage-bargaining to encourage or assure
any particular substantive outcome. In logic, these competing social
values may be mutually exclusive, but not so in the new judicial
consciousness, which accommodated both regulation and private-
ordering by refusing to push either principle to its limits.5 2
On a second, methodological level, the emerging legal conscious-
ness became sensitized to the social and political ramifications of
legal rules and decisions, but the Supreme Court was not prepared
simply to assimilate legal reasoning to social policy analysis. The
political realism that indicated the necessity of state intervention in
labor bargaining did not inexorably lead to legal realism as an adjudi-
catory method. On the contrary, the process at work was the reifica-
tion of ad hoc social policies into "values" or "first principles" that
to the outcome of the raw conflict of class power. I do not share the premise of liberal
political theory that there is an inherent contradiction between community interven-
tion and individual or group self-actualization and freedom. Nevertheless, in society
as presently constituted, there is no reason to assume that a grant of substantive review
powers to an administrative agency would, with any likelihood, result in a democratic
process or just terms of employment. The Board is a priori no more likely to serve the
needs of employees (or employers) than the courts or the private collective bargaining
process.
My political claim, therefore, does not rest on a preference for the assumption by
the Board of substantive review powers. Rather my claim is that, had the Court
permitted and encouraged the Board to assume such powers, a potentially radicalizing
force would have been introduced into the law by the making of a public political issue
of the substantive terms of the wage-bargain. Public discussion and criticism of Board
decisions respecting the fairness of terms of employment would have had a politicizing
and destabilizing impact on the labor movement by creating greater public under-
standing of the contingent nature of social relationships and the way in which the
purportedly neutral decisions of government reflect the preponderant influence of class
power on the state. In this sense, the Court's preference for a formal, proceduralist
model represented a deradicalization of the potential of the Wagner Act.
152. See Kennedy, supra note 38, at 1731-37. The problem with this unstable
merger was, of course, how courts deciding cases were to determine the relative weight
to be accorded to each branch of the dichotomy. It was not until the postwar period
that substantial efforts were made to develop a method for making such determina-
tions, while purporting to maintain the separation of law and politics. See note -77
infra and accompanying text.
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were then conceived to provide determinate-and therefore legiti-
mate-solutions to legal problems, as, for example, with Justice Rob-
erts' concept of the employer's right to protect the business and Jus-
tices Douglas' and Black's notion of free choice.'53
B. THE PUBLIC RIGHT DOCTRINE: NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PLURALIST POLITICAL THEORY
A classical problem of liberal political theory has been to pre-
serve the neutrality of the state in a world understood to be domi-
nated and motivated by the conflict of private interests. Liberal polit-
ical theory has always conceived of the state as being radically di-
vorced from, or rising above, civil society, the realm of private and
group interest. During the early years of the Great Depression, how-
ever, the purported neutrality of the state, particularly the federal
judiciary was, as had happened before, called into widespread doubt.
The New Dealers eventually appointed to the Court confronted a
massive crisis of legitimacy. Their difficult task, therefore, was to
make the law more responsive to pressing social priorities and the
constituencies that the reform programs of the New Deal were de-
signed to aid, while restoring the purported neutrality of the state.
That is, although the law was to be mobilized to carry out new regula-
tory and welfare functions representing the triumph of a particular
political coalition, the rhetoric of liberal legalism had to be repaired
and enhanced, proving that Americans did, indeed, live under the
rule of law, not men.
The articulation of a comprehensive modern administrative law
was one of the New Deal jurists' most creative responses to this di-
lemma. In this jurisprudence, the actions of administrative agencies
and tribunals were considered subject to the rule of law and not mere
reflections of the shifting interests of partisan power, yet administra-
tive bodies were also conceived to be relatively emancipated from
rule-formalism insofar as their responsiveness to changing crystalli-
zations of public interest and policy was deemed legitimate. This
uneasy merger of formalism and result-orientation required careful
and articulate justification. New doctrinal formulas were needed to
enable progressive courts to brush aside some of the finer concerns
and details of traditional private adjudication in reviewing the work
of the agencies, while at the same time avoiding any appearance of
capitulation to partisan interest.
A second challenging aspect of rehabilitating the state's image
as neutral arbiter above group conflict was to provide a theoretical
justification for the delegation of the lawmaking function (i.e., the
153. See note 276 infra and accompanying text.
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setting of enforceable standards of conduct) to socially significant
groups.'15 If the Wagner Act and the other New Deal reform measures
were to succeed, the law had to allow for some notion of legitimate
private lawmaking. The radical disjunction between public and pri-
vate that characterized classical liberal political theory was no longer
tenable in the late capitalist of welfare state in which the government
systematically and pervasively intervened in the private sector and,
conversely, in which institutions, such as corporations and unions,
hitherto deemed to be purely private in nature, increasingly assumed
the functions, attributes, or powers of quasi-governmental agencies.'3
On the other hand, the public/private distinction could not be aban-
doned altogether without subverting the basic philosophical premises
of the liberal democratic state. The preservation of the public/private
distinction in a world in which it was becoming increasingly incoher-
ent, at least in the classical liberal formulation, became one of the
central projects of the new jurisprudence of social conceptualism.
One minor but significant early episode in the process was the strat-
egy developed in the NLRA cases of maintaining the forms of private
conflict-resolution in the administrative and legal process while su-
perimposing on them a new version of the higher law through the
public right doctrine.
In Jones & Laughlin, Chief Justice Hughes made a remarkable
claim:
Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than
to safeguard the right of employees to self-organization and to select
representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or
other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their em-
ployer.
That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right
to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as
the [company] has to organize its business and select its own offi-
cers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free
exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and represen-
154. The delegation of lawmaking powers to private parties or groups is an essen-
tial feature of the private-ordering system. In a contract, for example, the state in
effect delegates an element of its sovereignty to the parties, who are permitted to
establish legal incidents governing their relationship that are legally protected as
against third parties. See Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HAzv. L. RaV. 553, 585-92
(1933); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HAzv. L. REv. 201 (1937). Nonethe-
less, the myth of American law had hitherto been that the delegation of sovereignty
to private groups is fundamentally repugnant to our constitutional scheme. See Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
155. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, ch. 3 (1976); A. Fraser, supra note
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tation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative
authority. "
Hughes' choice of language implied that the rights guaranteed by the
Act were not created by it. Rather, they were basic or inherent rights
deriving from a source of law much more fundamental than mere
statute.'- 7 Hughes conceived of the Act as providing for the protec-
tion, as a matter of public policy, of a right inhering in private law,",
and as striking a general balance between the respective private
rights of adverse parties, with the Board assigned the detailed task
of weighing and resolving clashes of private interests in particular
factual settings.
Of course, the historical record flatly contradicted the view that
the right to organize was recognized by law prior to 1935 as a funda-
mental, extrastatutory right, or, indeed, as a right at all. Perhaps
Chief Justice Hughes was motivated to use this schema by a desire
to depreciate the momentousness of what the Court was actually
doing in Jones & Laughlin. In any case, the opinion reflects the iner-
tia of legal concepts, the difficulty of conceptualizing radical change
even at the moment it is experienced or brought about. Though
everyone knew the Act was a marked political departure, the radical
innovations it implied in legal theory were at first only dimly under-
stood. The idea of a right had theretofore been associated with a
private law conception of adjudication, 5 ' and it is no surprise, there-
fore, that Hughes interpreted the Act within this conceptual frame-
work. Moreover, his account of the Act had, in retrospect, a great
virtue: it focused attention on the raw fact of class (group) conflict,
rather than on the nebulous, and ideological, conception of a public
interest rising above such conflict.
The Hughes formulation, however, was short-lived. The outline
of an alternative scheme first appeared, implicitly, in American Fed-
eration of Labor v. NLRB.160 The case was a political bombshell,
156. 301 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added).
157. What that source is we are never told, although in Texas & N.O.R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), Chief Justice Hughes denomi-
nated the right of railway workers to choose representatives for collective bargaining
without employer interference as a "property interest." Id. at 571.
158. No doubt this announcement came as a surprise to working people, particu-
larly those on the picket lines who were then facing a zenith of employer-inspired
violence. For example, the Memorial Day Massacre, in which peaceful, demonstrating
steel strikers were assaulted without warning, leaving ten dead and many wounded,
see I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 485-90, occurred several weeks after the Court held
the Act constitutional in Jones & Laughlin.
159. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAlRV. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976).
160. 308 U.S. 401 (1940)(Stone, J.).
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because the Court, in effect, allowed Harry Bridges' International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (CIO) to have a Pacific
Coast-wide bargaining unit over the outraged opposition of the rival
International Longshoremen's Association (AFL), which stood to lose
its small base on the Pacific coast. The Court's holding was that
judicial review of Board decisions in representation proceedings was
not available unless and until the employer was charged with an
unfair labor practice and raised a section 9161 issue as a defense." 2
This decision implicitly rested on the idea that the statutory scheme
does not protect private entitlements but protects certain public in-
terests. A private litigant was entitled to the orderly completion of
the Board's processes, but it had no individual right, entitlement, or
claim to the section 9 unit determination preferred by it. Thus, no
deprivation.of any right was involved in forbidding the courts to hear
the claims of aggrieved private parties except under the circum-
stances provided by the statutory scheme. Under other circum-
stances, there was literally no claim to be heard.
The case was widely viewed as a prolabor victory, notwithstand-
ing the wrath of the AFL, because the ruling put an end to one of the
employers' favorite antiunion delaying tactics. But it had an unfor-
tunate consequence, which CIO as well as AFL leaders were quick to
see. If the party aggrieved in the section 9 proceeding was the union,
for example, a union that later lost an election because of an improper
definition of the bargaining unit, it would have no remedy under the
Act because it would never be in a position to defend a refusal-to-
bargain charge."'
161. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970) (empow-
ering the National Labor Relations Board to certify the exclusive employee representa-
tive for purposes of collective bargaining).
162. See 308 U.S. at 406; cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd.. 320
U.S. 297 (1943) (federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear union's claim that National
Mediation Board wrongfully certified bargaining representative under Railway Labor
Act); United Electrical Radio & Mach. Workers v. International Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, 115 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1940) (federal courts may not adjudicate union's claim
that rival union conspired with companies to violate its statutory bargaining rights
even though such remedies as the Board may grant would not be fully congruent with
the wrongs allegedly suffered).
163. It soon became clear that this doctrinal system could lead to unacceptable
results. The Court was pushed into a dialectical response, namely the creation of a new
judicial remedy: a cause of action for the breach of the duty of fair representation. See
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Stone, J.). Note that once
union unfair labor practices were added to the statutory scheme, it became possible
to conceive of mechanisms by which an aggrieved union could seek review of section 9
decisions. For example, such developments have occurred under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, § 704(c), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970). See Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 F.2d
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The new public right schema was explicitly articulated less than
two months later in Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated
Edison Co. "I Alleged employer disobedience to a Court of Appeals
enforcement order prompted the union to move that the employer be
cited for contempt.6 5 Although the Board had standing to make
such a motion, 6' it had declined to do so. The issue, therefore, was
whether a private party could vindicate its rights under the Act by
this means. A unanimous Supreme Court said no. Chief Justice
Hughes wrote,
The Board as a public agency acting in the public interest, not any
private person or group, not any employee or group of employees, is
chosen as the instrument to assure protection from the described
unfair conduct in order to remove obstructions to interstate com-
merce.
When the Board has made its order, the Board alone is author-
ized to take proceedings to enforce it.
It is the Board's order on behalf of the public that the court
enforces. It is the Board's right to make that order that the court
sustains. The Board seeks enforcement as a public agent, not to give
effect to a "private administrative remedy.""'
As a result, if a successful charging party was aggrieved but the Board
refused fully to enforce its order through contempt proceedings, that
party was without remedy to protect its rights or even to obtain a
hearing. 8 The fundamental rights spoken of in Jones & Laughlin
were transmuted in the space of three years into privileges created by
the statute and therefore measured by the Board's discretion and
largesse in administering the statutory scheme. The rights of employ-
ees were now conceived to be held and defined at the pleasure of an
agency of the federal government. 6 '
704 (D.C. Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.
1963).
164. 309 U.S. 261 (1940) (Hughes, C.J.). This case was a sequel to Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See note 124 supra.
165. See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 106 F.2d 991
(2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam), aff'd, 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
166. See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261,
264-70 (1940) (construing National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. §
160 (1970)).
167. 309 U.S. at 265-69.
168. The rules of standing were liberalized in some respects by the Warron Court.
Thus, successful charged and charging parties now have standing to intervene in en-
forcement or review proceedings in the court of appeals, see UAW Local 283 v. Sco-
field, 382 U.S. 205 (1965), and thereby the right to seek Supreme Court review even
when the Board and the Solicitor General do not wish to apply for certiorari. See TuE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 877-78 (C. Morris ed. 1971). The Utility Workers rule still
prevails, however, as to contempt proceedings. See id. at 875.
169. See generally Boudin, "Representatives of Their Own Choosing" (pts. 1-2),
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Once launched, the public right doctrine exhibited a potent
power to override private interests. The Court allowed the Board to
adjudicate certain contract rights without requiring the Board to join
or afford a hearing to one of the contractual parties,'" employed the
public right doctrine to justify its previously mentioned rulings that
the technicalities of respondeat superior do not apply to section 8
proceedings,17 1 and invoked the doctrine to justify the breakdown of
traditional concepts of remedies. 72
37 ILL. L. Rav. 385, 38 IL. L. Rav. 41 (1943). Boudin was counsel for the petitioner
(the Union) in Utility Workers. See 309 U.S. at 261.
170. In a proceeding so narrowly restricted to the protection and en-
forcement of public rights, there is little scope or need for the traditional
rules governing the joinder of parties in litigation determining private rights.
Ordinarily where the rights involved in litigation arise upon a contract,
courts refuse to adjudicate the rights of some parties to the contract if the
others are not before it.
Here the right asserted by the Board is not one arising upon or derived
from the contracts between petitioner and its employees. The Board asserts
a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest
with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1940) (Stone, J.).
171. We do not doubt that the Board could have found these activities
to be unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act if countenanced
by [the company], and we think that to the extent that [the company]
may seek or be in a position to secure any advantage from these practices
they are not any the less within the condemnation of the Act because (the
company] did not authorize or direct them ...
The question is not one of the legal liability of the employer in damages
or for penalties on principles of agency or respondeat superior, but only
whether the Act condemns such activities as unfair labor practices so far as
the employer may gain from them any advantage in the bargaining process
of a kind which the Act proscribes. To that extent we hold that the employer
is within the reach of the Board's order to prevent any repetition of such
activities and to remove the consequences of them upon the employees' right
of self-organization, quite as much as if he had directed them.
H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 520-21 (1941)(Stone, J.).
172. The problem of remedies had been troublesome for the Court. In keeping
with the flexibility sought in the administrative process, section 10(c) provides great
latitude for the Board to fashion remedies against the backdrop of public policies
embodied in the Act. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. §
160(c)(1970). Nonetheless, Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone and Roberts were
reluctant to let go of the traditional conceptualistic notion that remedies are somehow
logically deducible from or inherent in the rights they secure. In several early cases the
Court reversed the Board for straying too far into the area of overbroad or unconven-
tional remedies. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941)(Stone, J.);
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940)(Hughes, C.J.); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939)(Hughes, C.J.); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)(Hughes, C.J.). But the realist view eventually triumphed
in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194
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The culmination of the public right conception occurred in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB. "I In that case, a CIO affiliate
had an overall majority and a majority in each of five of PPG's six
flat glass plants. An independent union, with a history of employer
domination,' claimed a majority in the sixth plant. The Board found
appropriate a single bargaining unit encompassing all six plants,'
thus writing off the independent union for practical purposes. The
Court affirmed the Board's action, relying in part on the view that it
was permissible for the Board to consider in deciding the case that,
if the sixth plant were placed in a separate bargaining unit, the em-
ployer could use it to maintain operations in the event of a strike in
the larger unit and thereby tip the balance of economic power in its
favor.' 71
The Court's holding itself was of modest significance, especially
since the Board had receded from its policy of certifying such massive
units prior to the Plate Glass decision.' 7 But the Court's conception
of the Board's role under the Act was of preeminent importance. Read
broadly, Plate Glass implied that determinations as to the appropri-
ateness of bargaining units were strictly reserved to the Board's dis-
cretion"' and that in making such determinations, the Board was
authorized to include in its calculations a balancing of the relative
economic power of the opposed class forces. 179 Presumably, the bal-
(1941) ("The Act does not create rights for individuals which must be vindicated
according to a rigid scheme of remedies. It entrusts to an expert agency the mainte-
nance and promotion of industrial peace."). See notes 249-75 infra and accompanying
text.
173. 313 U.S. 146 (1941)(Reed, J.).
174. See id. at 150. See generally Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 1210
(1938) (providing for withdrawal of recognition from dominated union), enforced per
curiar, 102 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1939).
175. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1115-22 (1939). See
generally Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 515 (1939) (employer committed
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain as to unit including the sixth plant),
enforced, 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
176. 313 U.S. at 164-65.
177. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 13 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1939).
178. As Justice Reed stated,
The petitioners' contention that § 9(a) grants to the majority of employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes the absolute right to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing is correct only in the
sense that the "appropriate unit" is the one declared by the Board under §
9 (b), not one that might be deemed appropriate under other circumstances.
313 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
179. An independent unit at Crystal City, the Board was justified in
finding, would frustrate division-wide effort at labor adjustments. It would
enable the employer to use the plant there for continuous operation in case
of stoppage of labor at the other plants. We are of the view that there was
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ancing of relative economic forces was deemed a matter of neutral,
expert judgment, although the Court never explained how one might
define or identify a public interest in one or another balance of power
between capital and labor. In practice, Plate Glass placed enormous
political power in the hands of the Board to delimit the contours of
legitimate class struggle. Not only was the Board granted wide discre-
tion in enforcing the Act, but it also had the power to define the
balance of opposing economic forces on which the substantive out-
come of collective bargaining depends.
Of course, it is not suggested that the Court granted the Board
carte blanche to restructure American class relations; the historical
impact of the case should not be exaggerated. Rather the effort here
is to recover the Court's conceptualization of the statutory scheme,
in which the Court recognized that as a practical matter the Board
had the power dramatically to shape the terrain on which private-
ordering will take place and thereby crucially to influence its out-
come.'" In Plate Glass the Court endowed this de facto power with
the imprimatur of law. Although institutional and political consider-
ations have led the Board generally to utilize this power discreetly
over the years, in the context of the late 1930's, Plate Glass brought
to fruition an intellectual movement to conceptualize employees'
rights as public rights, measured by the discretion of the Board.'"'
Unavoidably, the decision in Plate Glass created an intellectual justi-
fication for the dependency of labor on the state, thereby reinforcing
the cultural hegemony of liberal political theory.'." This dependence
hindered labor from conceiving of itself, or acting, as an autonomolus
adequate evidence to support the conclusion that the bargaining unit should
be division-wide.
313 U.S. at 164-65 (footnote omitted). But see Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d
293 (2d Cir.)(presenting as settled, and apparently never questioned, the proposition
that the Board may not weigh the potential economic balance of power in making unit
determinations), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966). The Plate Glass dissenters launched
a vitriolic attack on the Board's procedural conduct of the case, but apparently ac-
cepted the premise that the Board may permissibly sacrifice the wishes of the employ-
ees in the sixth plant in favor of the "greater effectiveness of employee bargaining
through a division-wide representative." 313 U.S. at 173. 1
180. The significance of this power was overlooked by even the most acute ob-
servers. See, e.g., Boudin, supra note 169.
181. See generally Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59
HARv. L. Ray. 720 (1946).
182. See note 12 supra. The doctrine's influence extended beyond the realm of
jurisprudence into that of political theory proper, which experienced a crisis parallel
to the one in law. The new jurisprudence was a precursor of, and provided intellectual
support for, one particular version of liberal political theory that came to dominate the
postwar scene, that is, "pressure group pluralism" as found, for example, in the work
of Robert Dahl and David Truman. See R. DAHL, WHO GovEres? (1961); D. "'u.tA.:,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PRoc.ss (1951).
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movement capable of fundamentally transforming the established
social relations of production. The public right doctrine created a
justification in political theory for labor's dependence on government,
thereby tending to transform a contingent historical relationship 3
into a moral destiny.
5 4
C. THE INHIBITION OF WORKER SELF-ACTIVITY
Labor was the beneficiary of an exciting series of legal victories
in the early years of Wagner Act interpretation. In procedural mat-
ters, the scope of judicial review of Board findings under section 10
was narrowly confined,' and the courts were forbidden to review or
interdict Board proceedings until they had run their proper course.'
Thus, the Court made clear that it would protect the Board's pro-
cesses from judicial invasion and employer stalling tactics. In sub-
stantive matters, the Court liberalized the law of picketing"7 and
endowed ordinary union activities with immunity under the antitrust
183. Due to certain insurmountable historical weaknesses, such as its status as
a minority movement, the conservatism and weakness of its leadership, and the great
power and flexibility of its corporate adversaries, the American labor movement was
dependent upon the federal government for legitimacy and protection in the late
1930's. Cf. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959 § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1970) ("in the public interest, it continues to be the
responsibility of the Federal Government to protect employees' rights"). This can be
seen particularly in the contribution of the Labor Board to reversing the CIO's strategic
defeat in the Little Steel Strike of 1937. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at
432-98, 727-34.
184. As a postscript to this discussion and a prelude to the next section, it should
be noted that the public right doctrine was applied selectively. That is, when the Court
disapproved of the Board's action in a particular case, it suddenly reverted to the more
exacting standards of traditional private adjudication. Most often, this latter approach
was used to defend the property rights of employers from encroachment by the public
rights supposedly protected under the Act. The result was severe limitations on the
protection of employee concerted activity. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941), discussed at notes 228-75 infra and accompanying text; NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), discussed at notes 201-17 infra and
accompanying text.
185. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
Waterman and Bradford are cited disapprovingly by Justice Frankfurter in his seminal
opinion in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478 (1951), though he
concurred in both of the earlier decisions.
186. See NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940) (no anticipatory judicial
review); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) (no anticipatory judicial review of Board's
unit determinations); In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938) (final order doctrine); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U.S. 54 (1938) (exhaustion of
remedies); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (exhaustion
rule). See also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939).
187. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); New Negro Alliance v. Sani-
tary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
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laws. "' The latter action brought an end to what for generations had
been one of the primary legal weapons used by employers against the
labor movement.
Intermixed with these cases, however, were several decisions nar-
rowing and limiting legally protected union activity and hampering
the effective enforcement of the Act. Chief among these decisions
were NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,'" condemning the sit-
down strike; NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., '" allowing
permanent replacement of economic strikers; NLRB v. Sands Manu-
facturing Co.,'' withdrawing section 7 protection from certain strike
activity in the context of an existing collective bargaining relation-
ship; and Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, I" establishing the mitigation
rule.
The early Wagner Act cases had a much more momentous conse-
quence than can be captured in this simple tally of labor's immediate
gains and losses. The unprecedented privileges granted to labor cre-
ated discord in conventional legal thought. In generating doctrines to
justify this new legal status, the Court was called upon to develop a
conception of the proper role of unions in the reformed social order.
Two motifs are paramount in the Court's portrait of "legitimate"
union activity. First was the fiduciary theme, the Court's view that
unions have an institutional role setting them apart from their mem-
bers. Initially this idea was but a conceptual corollary of the "quasi-
tort" schema Hughes articulated in Jones & Laughlin, namely, the
view that the union was something separate and apart from the em-
ployees and the purpose of the Act was to prevent unwarranted em-
ployer invasion of the privileged relationship between the employees
and their "agent."' 93 But the theme soon developed a life of its own.
The delineation of legitimate forms of concerted activity contained
the unstated proviso that unions wishing the protection of the Board
had to keep their members in line. Sands Manufacturing and
Fansteel were abrupt warnings that what, from a management
perspective, were the more spontaneous or undisciplined forms of
concerted activity, the midterm strike'94 and the sit-down strike,
would not be protected by the Act. The public right doctrine implied
that union conduct would not be judged solely against the backdrop
188. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). See also
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
189. 306 U.S. 240 (1939), discussed at notes 201-17 infra and accompanying text.
190. 304 U.S. 333 (1938), discussed at notes 116-20 supra and accompanying text.
191. 306 U.S. 332 (1939), discussed at notes 123-29 supra and accompanying text.
192. 313 U.S. 177 (1941), discussed at notes 228.75 infra and accompanying text.
193. See notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text.
194. Although a midterm strike is often an unauthorized or a wildcat strike, the
strike in Sands was neither. See generally 306 U.S. at 336-39.
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of competing employer and employee interests, but against the public
interest in industrial peace as well. The ideological premise that there
is such a general societal interest in the smooth operation of the
industrial system was always taken for granted. 9 5 The union was seen
not just as a private fiduciary vis-A-vis the membership of the bar-
gaining unit, but also as a "trustee" of this public interest, and
"responsible behavior" by unions became a quid pro quo for the legal
privileges extended by the Act.'96
Second, the Court's wage-bargain theme represented, as the
term implies, a conception that the function of a union was to make
a wage-bargain; that is, its role was limited to the sphere of ex-
change.' 97 The very power that unions had in arranging the sale of
labor power signaled their inevitable participation in reproducing the
alienation that characterized the work-process itself and negated the
alternative historical and moral claims they might have advanced
with respect to the sphere of production.'"9
195. The idea of a general or public interest overriding private or group interest
is a staple of liberal political thought, most brilliantly conceived in G. HEGEL, PILOSO-
PHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1965) (Berlin 1821), but with roots going back to T.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (London 1651) and with contemporary reflections in so-called
"policy science." But the public interest idea is a value-laden, indeed, ideological
construct in societies that are, in fact, dominated by class power. See generally notes
34-49 supra and accompanying text.
196. The fiduciary theme has become a dominant aspect of the nation's labor
policy. It is visible, inter alia, in the creation of a cause of action for breach of the duty
of fair representation, see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and its
progeny, in the regulatory scheme of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.), and in the doctrines bolstering the institutional power of unions
vis-a-vis their members, see, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
Unions should, of course, be obligated to act responsibly toward those they repre-
sent. Given the power of unions over unit members' lives, and the history of abuse in
areas such as race and sex discrimination, it would be intolerable not to have protec-
tions such as the duty of fair representation. My point is only that it was not histori-
cally inevitable that unions would come to play such an institutionalized role in bu-
reaucratic capitalism that their own internal political processes would be inadequate
guarantees of responsible behavior, or that the legal rights of labor would be measured
against a duty of unions to protect industrial peace as well as to represent their
members. The early conceptualization of unions as entities apart from their members
contributed to the historical process by which unions came to play this institutional
role, thereby creating the need for massive state intervention in their internal affairs.
197. Although no case states this proposition in such bold relief, it is implicit in
the totality of the Supreme Court opinions discussed in this Article.
198. Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing
a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie
at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment
of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in them-
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The negative implications of these two themes provided the un-
derpinnings of a narrow conception of the social relations of the work-
place in three fundamental and interrelated ways. First, the treat-
ment of workers as sellers of labor power and as consumers of com-
modities, but not as producers, hindered them from achieving an
alternative perspective in which worker self-activity, the process by
which workers produce value by embodying their labor power in
things, services, and relationships, would be recognized as the basis
of all production in, and reproduction of, society. The Court's vision
countered the corollary of this alternative premise, that workers' or-
ganizations ought to affirm and advance the proposition that those
whose collective efforts make social production possible should have
a decisive say in the decisions that affect the process, that they pose
themselves morally and institutionally as the authors of their own
destinies in the workplace.
Second, since it was imagined that there was an overall societal
interest in maintaining the prevailing industrial system, the Court's
fiduciary theme encouraged responsible unions to accept the social
order as given and to seek to defend and better the lot of their mem-
bers only within its ground rules. Here again, the fact that the social
fabric is itself produced and reproduced through the activity of so-
ciety's members was obscured and denied.
Finally, since union activity was denominated as something sep-
arate from members' self-activity in the workplace, unions could not
function as participatory institutions in which workers continuously
articulated and redefined their aspirations for the governance and
transformation of the work-process. The union was not expected to
foreshadow the organizational form of a democratic workplace, nor to
provide the workers with an "experiment... in self-organization, in
initiative and collective decision-making, in short, an experiment in
the possibility of their own emancipation.""' In sum, the Court's
narrowly restricted vision of legitimate union activity stood in every
sense as a barrier to the possibility that labor would participate in
bringing about fundamental social change.2 0
selves primarily about conditions of employment .... If, as I think clear,
the purpose of § 8 (d) is to describe a limited area subject to the duty of
collective bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental
to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise ... should be excluded from
that area.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)(Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
199. Gorz, Reform and Revolution, in THE SoctAusT REGISr 125 (1968).
200. The discussion in the preceding paragraphs has relied extensively upon the
workers' control tradition within Western European socialism. See generally Tm UN-
KNowN DIMENSION: EURoPEAN M msRiM SINcE LENtN (D. Howard & K. Klare eds. 1972).
19781
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
These themes are vividly illustrated by the extraordinary case of
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,201 which condemned the sit-
down strike. In Fansteel, massive and undisputed employer unfair
labor practices designed to defeat unionization of the plant provoked
the employees to stage a sit-down strike in their factory. They were
evicted by the police, and many strikers were fined or jailed under
state law. The employer then encouraged the formation of a company
union, continuing its course of illegal conduct.0 2 The Board at-
tempted to undo the effects of the employer illegality by ordering the
company to bargain on request with the bona fide union and to rein-
state the strikers.2 3 The Court agreed that the employer had commit-
ted unfair labor practices,"' but overruled the reinstatement of the
sit-down strikers, holding that under the Act the company could
legally discharge the strikers for occupying the plant and that the
Board lacked authority under section 10(c) 05 to order reinstate-
ment.20 1 In the language of Chief Justice Hughes,
reprehensible as was that conduct of [the company], there is no
ground for saying that it made [the company] an outlaw or de-
prived it of its legal rights to the possession and protection of its
property. The employees had the right to strike but they had no
license to commit acts of violence or to seize their employer's plant.
• . . But in its legal aspect the ousting of the owner from lawful
possession is not essentially different from an assault upon the offi-
cers of an employing company, or the seizure and conversion of its
Admittedly, this tradition was not strong in the United States prior to the 1930's, for
reasons obviously nonlegal in nature. But to the extent that the crisis of the 1930's
offered the possibility of a rupture in the historical continuum, legal practice contrib-
uted to reinforcing the traditional political culture.
201. 306 U.S. 240 (1939)(Hughes, C.J.). See also Hart & Prichard, The Fansteel
Case: Employee Misconduct and the Remedial Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 52 HARv. L. REv. 1275 (1939)(representative of the realist attack on formalism
in the 1930's). Hart's name appears on the Government brief in a number of the cases
discussed in this Article. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 73, NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Brief for Respondent at 41, Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938); Brief for Petitioner at 55, NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938). For Hart's subsequent contributions, see
note 277 infra.
202. See 306 U.S. at 247-50.
203. See Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 952-53, rev'd, 98 F.2d 375
(7th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
204. See 306 U.S. at 251-52.
205. Section 10(c) states that "[ilf ... the Board shall be of the opinion that
any person named in the complaint has engaged in . . . any. . . unfair labor practice,
then the Board shall . . . order . . . such person . . . to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
206. See 306 U.S. at 252-59.
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goods, or the despoiling of its property or other unlawful acts in order
to force compliance with demands. To justify such conduct because
of the existence of a labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice
would be to put a premium on resort to force instead of legal reme-
dies and to subvert the principles of law and order which lie at the
foundations of society.M
The extreme formalism underlying the Fansteel opinion is evi-
dent in Hughes' focus on the legal aspects of the discharge, rather
than on the scope of the Board's remedial powers. Hughes reasoned
that the strikers' tortious conduct was independent from the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices and an adequate basis for divesting
them of their status as employees,25 notwithstanding the language of
section 2(3), which provides for the continuation of employee status
in contemplation of law notwithstanding its cessation in fact in
connection with current labor disputes or unfair labor practices.2'
Accordingly, it followed that the strikers could not avail themselves
of the protection and remedies of the statute. Hughes, however, belat-
edly recognized that the remedial powers of the Board were not lim-
ited to the assistance of employees;210 the ultimate test under section
10(c) was whether reinstatement would serve, under the circumstan-
ces, to effectuate the policies of the Act.2 " Responding briskly in the
negative, Hughes argued that reinstatement would only give license
to tortfeasors and discourage the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes.2 12 Concluding this formalist tour de force, Hughes casti-
gated the workers for their sit-down tactic:
It was a highhanded proceeding without shadow of legal right ....
- This was not the exercise of "the right to strike" to which
the Act referred . . . . It was an illegal seizure of the buildings in
order to prevent their use by the employer in a lawful manner and
thus by acts of force and violence to compel the employer to sub-
mit.2
13
207. Id. at 253.
208. See id. at 255-57.
209. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 2(3). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1970).
210. Note, however, that Justice Stone concurred solely on the ground that, as
nonemployees, the strikers were ineligible for remedial reinstatement under section
10(c). See 306 U.S. at 263-65. In an excess of formalism, he claimed that the statute
did not withdraw the employer's right "to terminate the employer-employee relation-
ship for reasons dissociated with the stoppage of work because of unfair labor prac-
tices." Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
211. See id. at 257.
212. See id. at 258.
213. Id. at 252, 256.
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The realists bitterly counterattacked, contending that the real
question was the Board's expert assessment, arguably proper under
section 10(c), that the purposes of the Act would best be served by
reinstating the strikers.211 Since any unlawful acts committed by the
strikers had already been punished quite severely under state law,"15
to impose the further penalty of allowing the company permanently
to sever the employment relationship would permit employers to sub-
vert the Act by provoking sit-down strikes or other tortious conduct
and then reaping the benefits of their unfair labor practices by immu-
nizing themselves from the Board's remedial powers. This, at any
rate, was the Board's considered judgment.21 1 The real issue of the
case, brusquely avoided by the Court, was the soundness and legiti-
macy of this judgment of social policy.217
The best that can be said for Hughes' view is that it blatantly
ignored historical and social reality. The Court ignored the fact that
the sit-down strikes were essentially a reaction to the widespread and
often violent refusal by employers to obey the law between 1935 and
1940. The historical record is clear that the sit-down strikes were an
indispensable weapon with which workers stemmed the tide of em-
ployer resistance to unions and to the law;211 inferentially, they
thereby helped create the political conditions for the Court's leftward
shift in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish19 and NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.2  That is, the sit-down strikes contributed to,
rather than detracted from, whatever law and order existed in in-
dustrial life in 1939 when Hughes delivered Fansteel. Moreover, in
sharp contrast to contemporary but traditionally conducted strikes,
the sit-downs in 1936-1938 caused no deaths and little property dam-
age. 2'
The sit-down strike was important not only because it was so
effective tactically, but also because it minimized the risks of picket-
line violence. The traditional strike separates the employees from the
workplace and from each other. Typically striking workers come to-
gether only serially, on the picket line. In the sit-down, however,
workers posed themselves as collectively capable of organizing the
workplace. The logistics of the sit-down required the constant parti-
214. See id. at 267 (Reed, J., dissenting in part).
215. See id. at 249.
216. See Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 949-51, rev'd, 98 F.2d 375
(7th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
217. See generally Hart & Prichard, supra note 201, at 1309-29.
218. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 499-501. See generally J. BREcmE, supra
note 9, ch. 5.
219. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
220. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
221. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 499.
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cipation of all in decisionmaking and fostered a spirit of community,
cooperation, and initiative. The sit-downs nurtured a new psychologi-
cal and emotional experience: "'The fact that the sit-down gives the
worker in mass-production industries a vital sense of importance can-
not be overemphasized.' "2 The sit-downs were a utopian breach in
the endless regularity and pessimism of everyday life, a "dereifying"
explosion of repressed human spirit.m
By ignoring these social realities and condemning the sit-down
strike, the Court interpreted the Act as standing against the possibil-
ity of emancipatory workplace experiments. Fansteel condemned a
tactic designed to transcend the disjunction between the union and
its members; it bolstered the forces of union bureaucracy in their
efforts to quell the spontaneity of the rank and file. As such, it
marked the end of the radical potential of the 1930's by demarcating
the outer limits of disruption of the established industrial order that
the law would tolerate. The utopian aspirations for a radical restruc-
turing of the workplace, engendered by enactment of the Wagner Act
and the intoxicating experience of the rise of the CIO, were symboli-
cally thwarted by Fansteel, which erected labor law reform as a road-
block in their path.
D. THE RoOTS OF MODERN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The contours of a more modern legal consciousness, hinted at in
the earliest Wagner Act cases, were clearly visible by the beginning
of the 1940's as the legal crisis of the previous decade drew to a close.
The Court could be divided, somewhat schematically, into three
groups. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone and Roberts contin-
ued the conceptualist tradition. They were reluctant to abide by the
Board's expert judgment and fearful, to some extent, of the new
power of labor. 4 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, sometimes
joined by Reed, formed the realist contingent. Their opinions evinced
a purposive style of legal analysis and a willingness to defer to the
discretion of the Board. There is a curious correlation between legal
styles and these Justices' understanding of the fundamental purposes
222. Brecher, The Sitdown Strikes of the 1930's: From Baseball to Bureaucracy.
4 RoOT & BRANcH PmPHmLrr 23 (n.d.) (quoting L. ADAMc, Mv AhtmucA 408 (1938)).
223. "[The] potential of ordinary workers organizing their own action posed an
implicit threat to every form of hierarchy, authority, and domination. For if the work-
ers could direct a social enterprise as complex as, say, the Flint sitdown, why could
they not reopen production under their own direction?" rd.
224. As late as 1941, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts still believed that
unions could be attacked under the antitrust laws for engaging in ordinary secondary
boycott activity. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 243-46 (1941) (dissent-
ing opinion).
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of the Act. The conceptualist group persistently emphasized what is
probably the most instrumental goal of the Act, industrial peace,
whereas the realists stressed the more ethereal goal of employee free
choice.2 2 Since bringing social policy explicitly into legal analysis was
already disturbing to the more traditional judicial mind, the concep-
tualists probably felt most comfortable coming to grips with urgent
and undiscriminating priorities rather than trying to elaborate on
more philosophical themes requiring a more thorough-going transfor-
mation of their personal assumptions. On the other hand, in Douglas'
and Black's emphasis on free choice, an abstract, highly conceptual
term, can be seen an intimation of future movement away from their
early realism. In the postwar period Black's labor opinions evinced a
rigid contractualist formalism,28 whereas Douglas' disillusionment
with Big Labor led him to adopt a stance of tenacious individualism
or "anti-institutionalism. '"
225. Compare H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941) (Stone, J.), NLRB
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (Stone, J.), and NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (Hughes, C.J.), with NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584
(1941) (Douglas, J.), and International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79
(1940) (Douglas, J.) (describing freedom of choice as "the essence of collective bargain-
ing").
226. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)(dissenting opinion); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962). Black's formalism was most apparent, of course, in his treatment of
the first amendment. His absolutism on free speech impacted on his labor opinions.
He was prepared to hold that both the 1951 union security amendments to the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970), and certain portions of section 8(b)(4)
added by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), were unconstitutional
infringements of protected first amendment liberties. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76 (1964) (concurring opinion) (construing 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1970)); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 791
(1961) (dissenting opinion) (construing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970)). See also
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445-53 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
The liberal political thrust of Black's first amendment formalism as contrasted
to the conservatism of pre-New Deal formalism on labor issues illustrates the fact that
the political tendency of legal formalism, or legal realism, cannot be deduced a priori.
See Kennedy, supra note 38, at 1777.
227. This attitude can be detected in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addi-
tion Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975)(dissenting opinion); NLRB v.
Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973)(dissenting opinion); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd,,
409 U.S. 213 (1972); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233
(1971) (dissenting opinion); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Work-
ers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967)(Black,
J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); National Woodworking Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 612 (1967)(Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); Local 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)(dissenting opinion);
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)(concurring opinion); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concur-
ring); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)(concurring opin-
ion).
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It is appropriate to put Justice Frankfurter in a separate cate-
gory. Though his opinions sounded the themes of legal realism, he
was a legalist through-and-through, and the roots of his later attempt
to mediate between realism and conceptualism were already appar-
ent. Much sooner than Black's or Douglas', Frankfurter's work
showed glimpses of the emerging "social conceptualism."
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,22 the last Wagner Act case before
Pearl Harbor, provides an excellent vehicle for delineating these dis-
parate judicial styles and for sketching the emerging legal conscious-
ness that came to dominate the postwar period. The case tendered
four major questions:22 (1) Does an employer violate section 8(3) by
refusing to hire job applicants because of their participation in union
activity or affiliation with a union? (2) If so, is the Board authorized
under section 10(c) to order the employer to offer jobs to such ag-
grieved workers? (3) Is the Board authorized to order reinstatement
of aggrieved employees who have obtained "substantially equivalent
employment" during the course of the litigation? (4) Must aggrieved
employees mitigate their damages by seeking alternative work while
awaiting redress before the Board? The Court, with some qualifica-
tions, answered each question affirmatively, although the respective
majorities were formed by different Justices.
The separate opinions in Phelps Dodge reveal the stages of devel-
opment in modem legal thought. Justice Stone's opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Hughes, was largely a dissent. It reveals both the wood-
enness of traditional formalism and Stone's tentative gropings toward
the social conceptualist style most apparent in Justice Frankfurter's
opinion. Stone and Hughes agreed that discrimination in hiring was
a section 8(3) violation,nt but denied that the Board could order an
offending employer to offer jobs or pay compensation to the victims."2
In their view, the employer could be punished by the stigma of a
cease-and-desist order, but the aggrieved employee could get no per-
sonal redress." This was an odd result in light of the oft-repeated
insistence that the Act was "remedial, not punitive,"23 " and Stone
reached it by a tortured path. He defined the issue to be whether
section 10(c) allowed the Board to force a particular employee on an
228. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
229. See id. at 181.
230. See generally Boudin (pt. 2), supra note 169, at 54-68.
231. Section 8(3) forbids discrimination that would "encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act §
8(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
232. See 313 U.S. at 210.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 208; accord, Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
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unwilling employer, "a remedial power which few courts had ever
assumed to exercise or had been thought to possess."" 5 He then pro-
posed to answer this question by determining whether the words in
section 10(c) granting the Board's remedial powers, "including" the
power of reinstatement, implied that remedies not specifically men-
tioned were forbidden. The meaning of the word "including," he
wrote, "must be determined by [reference to] the purpose of the
Act." '236 Though this sounds like realism, Stone immediately es-
chewed a purposive analysis by concluding that Congress probably
did not intend to allow the remedy (a) because of "the traditional
reluctance of courts to compel the performance of personal service
contracts"' 7 and (b) because "an authority to order reinstatement is
not an authority to compel the employer to instate as his employees
those whom he has never employed." ' 8 Point (a), with its attempted
overlay of traditional contract doctrine onto the statute, is refuted by
the fact that Congress overrode this precise reluctance in allowing the
reinstatement remedy in the first place. Point (b) merely states the
undisputed point that reinstatement is something different from an
offer of new employment; the mere fact that they are different is not
by itself a reason for a different conclusion of law.
Justice Stone was no more persuasive in his argument that the
Board could not order reinstatement of aggrieved employees who ob-
tained substantially equivalent employment because section 10(c)
only authorized reinstatement of employees and because the defini-
tion of "employee" in section 2(3) excluded unfair labor practice
victims who obtained substantially equivalent employment. 39 Both
statements represented mechanically restrictive readings of the sta-
tutory language. Section 10(c) provides that the Board's powers shall
include the reinstatement of employees;"'0 section 2(3) provides that
employees shall include those who are illegally discharged but who
have not found other equivalent employment."' The words of the
statute did not by themselves settle the question before the Court,
and a construction-that is, a judicial act-was required. In keeping
with the formalist style, Stone obscured the volitional elements of
judicial action, thereby obscuring the political content of his decision.
Justice Murphy's opinion, joined by Justices Black and Douglas,
was at the other end of the spectrum of legal analysis. The motif was
235. 313 U.S. at 210-11.
236. Id. at 211.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 212.
239. Id. at 208-10.
240. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
241. Id. § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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starkly realist: judicial deference to the Labor Board's decisions
based on the latter's informed view of social policy; in other words,
the abandonment of the rule of law as traditionally understood.
Though more candid than Stone's, Murphy's opinion also obscured
the political nature of judicial action by referring issues to the Board's
expertise.42 Murphy stated that the Board should be allowed to order
reinstatement of employees who found new jobs because the Board
might conclude that this was a good idea and the Act did not forbid
it.2 m On the mitigation question, he argued that (a) the Act does not
require mitigation "in so many words," ' (b) the Board has discretion
not to require mitigation deductions,2" and (c) it is not the Court's
business to displace the Board's judgment if it is, when "tested in the
light of statutory standards . . . within the permissible range of the
Board's discretion."2' " This "standard," of course, tells us nothing.
The phrases "statutory standards" and "permissible range" are with-
out content apart from a judicial elaboration of the meaning of the
Act. Thus, this ardent realist slid directly into the formalist trap of
imagining that abstract principles decide cases. Murphy did tell us
that the Board "might properly conclude" that mitigation should not
be required, since such a position might well effectuate the purposes
of the Act.27 But his analysis was not really about the Act's purposes;
it boiled down to the view that the Board's rule would make things a
little bit tougher for offending employers than Justice Frankfurter's
rule. 8 Murphy's approach was radically unstable as a model for
judicial reasoning, and it helps to explain the birth of social concep-
tualism. To remain within the legalist institutional framework, which
none of the realists had any manifest purpose to go beyond, the realist
judge must eventually legitimate instrumental reasoning by reifying
his or her core political and social values, by turning them into doc-
trines. That is, realism must evolve toward a species of formalism.
I have saved Justice Frankfurter's opinion, written for the Court,
until last. It is a remarkable document, symbolizing the transition to
a new phase in legal history. Rarely does one opinion traverse the
entire spectrum of judicial styles with so little hesitation. At the
outset, Justice Frankfurter sounded the realist theme of social
242. See 313 U.S. at 204-07.
243. See id. at 202-05.
244. Id. at'206. Justice Murphy correctly pointed out that the Act does not
require a deduction from back pay for sums actually earned, let alone wages lost due
to inexcusable failure to seek work, see id.; it was the Board's practice, however, to
make this deduction, see id. at 198 n.7.
245. See id. at 206.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See text accompanying notes 271-75 infra.
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policy analysis. His initial discussion of the purposes of the Act
strongly resembled a memorandum that he had written for President
Roosevelt in 1935.49 In each, Frankfurter portrayed the Wagner Act
as the inevitable codification of settled principles of federal labor
policy, citing the experience of the War Labor Board, the Railway
Labor Act, and so on.20 This was interesting as intellectual history,
but politically disingenuous, given the extraordinary opposition that
greeted the Wagner Act. 25'
Frankfurter's Phelps Dodge discussion of the Act's policies was
somewhat jumbled. He earnestly argued that the Act did not take
away the employer's freedom so long as the employer freely recog-
nized the adverse claims of labor.2 2 The Act "leaves the adjustment
of industrial relations to the free play of economic forces but seeks to
assure that the play of those forces be truly free." 5 The Act does not
interfere with the employer's rights so long as the employer does not
abuse those rights by doing something the Act condemns. Protection
of employees' right to organize "does not curtail the appropriate
sphere of managerial freedom; it furthers the wholesome conduct of
business enterprise. ' '2 " In sum, Frankfurter told employers that the
first principle was always the "free market," but that the law would
take away their freedom so as to make their freedom truly free. No
doubt employers found scant reassurance in these contradictory and
purportless phrases.
But reading the opinion in the light of the memorandum, one
gets a glimpse of what Frankfurter really believed. In the opinion he
implied that eventually all reasonable employers would accommo-
date themselves to collective bargaining."5 This was an echo of a
sentiment in the earlier piece:
249. ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 603 (M.
Freedman ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTERI (memoran-
dum from Justice Frankfurter to President Roosevelt, dated 1941; its actual composi-
tion, however, is placed by the editor in early 1935, with revisions in 1936).
250. Compare id. at 604, with Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183-
85 (1941).
251. Frankfurter went so far as to cite the Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424
(1898)(repealed 1913), as background evidence of a national consensus that discrimina-
tion in hiring should be suppressed, see 313 U.S. at 184, without pausing to note that
the provisions of the Erdman Act most directly related to the issues of Phelps Dodge
had been declared unconstitutional in the celebrated case of Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908). Frankfurter failed to mention his own stake in the political devel-
opments that he reviewed: one of his early positions in the federal government, launch-
ing a long career as a superlative corporate liberal technician, was as chairman of
President Wilson's War Labor Policies Board.
252. See 313 U.S. at 182-83.
253. Id. at 183.
254. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 182-83.
[Vol. 62:265
WAGNER ACT
The day of industrial absolutism is done. All our experience
since the industrial revolution demonstrates that employers as a
class cannot be relied upon, voluntarily and out of the goodness of
their hearts, to give a square deal to unorganized labor; this has been
precluded by the pressure of immediate self-interest and the inexor-
able workings of the competitive system . ..
• ..Once the employer has ungrudgingly accepted the process
of collective bargaining with the freely chosen representatives of his
employees, differences as to wages and hours are more readily recon-
ciled by negotiation or arbitration. Reasonableness begets reasona-
bleness. On the other hand, stubborn refusal to deal with the repre-
sentatives chosen by the employees, the irresponsible use of force or
economic power, the maintenance of elaborate systems of espionage,
black lists, and other familiar devices, to thwart efforts of employees
to organize in their own way, only result in an accumulation of
bitterness that sooner or later will break out in the most serious
manifestations of industrial disturbance. The employers, and espe-
cially the leaders in the big association of employers, have a grave
responsibility at this juncture. Mock heroics about preferring to go
to jail rather than submit to this iniquitous statute, incitements to
mass disobedience of its provisions, will tend to produce dangerous
frustrations of labor's reasonable human aspirations and play into
the hands of extremists who insist that nothing is to be gained by
peaceful processes. "6
As indicated, Frankfurter feared that initially some employers might
not have had the good sense to arrange a modus vivendi with labor.
Such recalcitrant employers were a threat and had to be dealt with
for the good of the social order. He never quite said this in so many
words, although he self-confidently asserted that a driving motive
behind enactment of the NLRA was to remove obstacles to the pros-
perity of labor organizations,nl a goal that he saw as imperative to
the survival of liberal capitalism. Frankfurter's position was almost
a parody of the reason/fiat antinomy:ns if the employers of America
were not persuaded by reason to work out an accommodation with
collective bargaining, then they would be forced to be reasonable by
the raw power of the law and the legions of organized labor. The
breadth and self-confidence of this political vision are staggering.
Frankfurter's opinion proceeded to sing paeans to purposive legal
reasoning, telling us that statutes cannot be interpreted like mathe-
256. RoosEvELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 249, at 604-05.
257. 313 U.S. at 186. See note 56 supra.
258. The "reason/fiat antinomy" refers to the belief that the inherent character
of law in societies dominated by legalist culture is a combination of reason and fiat, a
combination of the "discovery" of an order and the "imposition" of an order. See
Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HAv. L. Rav. 376, 376-82 (1946).
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matical symbols,"' that "verbal logic from which the meaning of
things has evaporated""2 ' is anathema, and that industrial experi-
ence, history, and the social policy of the Act are the keys to interpre-
tation, not judicial maxims."8 ' He praised the Board's expert judg-
ment and discretion, to which Congress had wisely entrusted front-
line interpretation of the Act."'2 Based on his purposive analysis, in
the light of the historical background, he concluded that discrimina-
tion in hiring was a section 8(3) violation remediable by an order to
offer employment"3 and that reinstatement of equivalently employed
complainants was authorized by section 10(c).11
Frankfurter then performed an about-face so subtle that its im-
plications are not visible until a second or third reading:
[Tihe mere fact that the victim of discrimination has obtained
equivalent employment does not itself preclude the Board from
undoing the discrimination and requiring employment. But neither
does this remedy automatically flow from the Act itself when dis-
crimination has been found. A statute expressive of such large pub-
lic policy as that on which the National Labor Relations Board is
based must be broadly phrased and necessarily carries with it the
task of administrative application. There is an area plainly covered
by the language of the Act and an area no less plainly without
it. . . .Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a
matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the
allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the
danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into
the more spacious domain of policy. On the other hand, the power
with which Congress invested the Board implies responsibility-the
responsibility of exercising its judgment in employing the statutory
powers.za
As far as it goes, this was an orthodox realist argument, but it pro-
duced a strange result. The Court remanded the case so that the
Board could exercise its statutory responsibility by determining
whether the Act's purposes would be effectuated by reinstatement of
the particular complainants involved. " While assuring the reader
that he had no intention of invading the area of remedial policy
assigned to the Board, 7 Frankfurter nevertheless provided a list of
259. See 313 U.S. at 185.
260. Id. at 191.
261. See id. at 182-86, 188.
262. See id. at 188, 193-94.
263. See id. at 185-88.
264. See id. at 189-93.
265. Id. at 193-94.
266. See id. at 193-97.
267. See id. at 194, 195, 197.
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factors for the Board to consider in reaching its policy decision.2
The only problem with all of this is that, on the record presented,
the Board had already carefully and explicitly made a finding that
the Act's purposes would be effectuated by reinstatement.Y' Frank-
furter's motive was not simply to reprimand the Board for supposedly
having failed to make a considered policy judgment, but implicitly
to pronounce that henceforth the Board would in all cases be required
to consider a victim's obtainment of substantially equivalent employ-
ment before ordering an employer to make work available. Frank-
furter thus read a major restriction into the broad remedial powers
granted to the Board under section 10(c) and flatly overruled his own
call for deference to the Board's expertise.20
Justice Frankfurter took a similar approach on the mitigation
issue, although here his faith in the inherent superiority of judicial
reasoning' was even more explicit. He stated,
268. See id. at 195.
269. See id. at 204 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
270. Although this rule is never explicitly stated, it is implicit in Frankfurter's
discussion of the "three possible constructions" of section 10(c) in light of section 2(3).
See id. at 190-91. Frankfurter rejected the view that section 2(3) prohibited the Board
from ordering affirmative action with respect to an "equivalently employed" em-
ployee; but he also rejected a "c'ompletely distributive" reading of sections 10(c) and
2(3) "whereby the factor of 'regular and substantially equivalent employment' in no
way limits the Board's usual power to require employment to be offered" to a discrimi-
natee. Id. at 190. He opted instead for "an avoidance of this either-or reading" of the
statute, id. at 190-91, that is, for a construction that appraised the relevance of the
discriminated's substantially equivalent employment in light of the Board's mandate
to effectuate the policies of the Act. In other words, labor policy required that sections
10(c) and 2(3) be harmonized or balanced by an obligation upon the Board always to
review the factor of equivalent employment before ordering reinstatement or similar
affirmative action. Frankfurter offered no real analysis of social interests that made
this the preferable approach. Moreover, the case did not even present this issue for
decision. The Board had held that it had the power to order an offer of work notwith-
standing the fact that equivalent employment had been obtained, see Phelps Dodge
Corp., 19 N.L.R.B. 547, 598, modified, 113 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1940), modified, 313 U.S.
177 (1941), and the Court explicitly sustained this power, see 313 U.S. at 193. But no
party had sought review to determine whether it was proper for the Board to exercise
that power without first making a finding as to the impact of the equivalent employ-
ment. The Board's posture was that it had in fact made such a finding. The Company
challenged the adequacy of the Board's findings of fact and judgments of policy, and
also the underlying question of the Board's power, but did not raise the abstract legal
question whether the Board was duty bound to make a specific finding with respect to
the impact of equivalent employment before exercising any remedial powers. There
was a subsidiary dispute over whether certain of the discriminatees had in fact found
equivalent employment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board on this evidentiary
issue, see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1940), modified,
313 U.S. 177 (1941), but the Board did not seek review of this holding, resting on its
view that vindication of the Act's purposes required affirmative remedial action here
even if these individuals had found equivalent jobs, see 313 U.S. at 197.
271. Justice Frankfurter commented years later "that law represents the disin-
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Making the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an
unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy
which the Board enforces. Since only actual losses should be made
good, it seems fair that deductions should be made not only for
actual earnings by the worker but also for losses which he willfully
incurred.22
This unvarnished fiat flatly overruled a considered policy judgment
of the Board and profoundly undercut effective enforcement of the
Act. 3 Having intoned the by now monotonous "public right" slogan,
he introduced into federal labor law an absolutely classical private
adjudication doctrine. His sole authority for the rule was the ancient
maxim that mitigation doctrines serve the beneficent purpose of
"promoting production and employment." ' By placing this strange
construction on a statute passed in the midst of the worst depression
in American history, Frankfurter made a mockery of his earlier in-
junction to interpret statutes in the context of the historical and
social exigencies that led to their enactment, to avoid "verbal logic
from which the meaning of things has evaporated."21
A microcosm of modern legal consciousness, Phelps Dodge con-
tained a chaotic amalgam of conceptualism and realism, rulebound-
edness and ad hoc balancing, deference to nonjudicial sources of law
and unhesitating faith in the superiority of the judicial mind. This
jurisprudential m6lange transcended political lines and attitudes as
to whether the proper judicial role is one of activism or restraint. I
believe that all of modern legal consciousness partakes of this hodge-
podge character. It is a consciousness in which contrasting styles of
terested processes of Reason, and particularly is this so when law is pronounced by the
judiciary." Frankfurter, Samuel Williston: An Inadequate Tribute to a Beloved
Teacher, 76 HARV. L. Rzv. 1321, 1322 (1963).
272. 313 U.S. at 197-98.
273. In effect, the burdens and costs of vindicating section 7 rights were placed
on the victimized employees, not on the wrongdoer. Most discharged employees will
be required to look for a new job just to survive. Allowing the employer the mitigation
deduction, however, means that back-pay orders will be reduced to a minimal tariff
far outweighed by the benefit of halting incipient union activity. Frequently the em-
ployee will only be able to find work at a great distance from home and, once having
moved, will simply forget about the Board case. In addition, the mitigation rule re-
duces damages in times of rising employment, when union activity often heats up, and
maximizes damages in times of high unemployment, when, due to the paralyzing
barriers of cynicism and fear, unionization campaigns often experience difficulty get-
ting off the ground.
On the mitigation issue, Frankfurter wrote only for himself and Justice Reed.
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Stone (who dissented as to other issues) concurred,
making a majority against the Black-Douglas-Murphy dissent. Justice Roberts did not
participate and Justice McReynolds had retired but was unreplaced.
274. 313 U.S. at 200.
275. Id. at 191.
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legal reasoning are simultaneously and unreflectively employed by
the same court or even the same judge; in which the public/private
distinction is invoked as the basis of judicial decisions, as though it
were a concept of scientific precision and with no apparent recogni-
tion that the distinction has assumed formidable ideological and
mystificatory functions in the welfare state; in which state regulation
of private economic activity is assumed to be a legitimate and even
compelling mode of achieving progressive reform, while the ideal of
the free market is simultaneously upheld as the proper basis of social
organization; and in which the antinomy of reason and fiat is under-
stood to pervade the legal process while at the same time it appears
to be a veritable public responsibility of the judge to obscure or veil
this fact. The formalist and realist traditions are continued sub silen-
tio in judicial decisions, but in a manner consistent with neither legal
vision. The rule of law is preserved, though in an updated, more
socially responsive form.
The full rehabilitation of legalism awaited the relative social
stability of the Cold War era, when it again became possible to at-
tempt a totalizing jurisprudence, a merger of realism and the social
policies it imported into the law with the traditions of formalist juris-
prudence. 8 No doubt such attempts to revitalize legalism have dom-
inated postwar American.legal thought, to some extent quelling the
residual disquiet left over from the legal crisis of the 19 3 0's.zn For this
276. Central to the process of the mutual assimilation is the inevitable tendency
of realism to evolve into a species of formalism. This tendency arises for several rea-
sons. First, because liberal political theory and social science are unable candidly to
confront the reality of class power and class domination in capitalist society, they
necessarily serve an ideological and mystificatory role; in particular, the tendency of
liberal social thought (which is harnessed by, but ultimately contributes to the trans-
formation of, legal realism) is to present, as scientifically necessary, answers to ques-
tions involving choices between competing political values and interests. Second, and
more generally, all legal decisions are necessarily made within a context of assumptions
(i.e., a "conceptless" jurisprudence is an epistemological impossibility), and the histor-
ical tendency is for these underlying assumptions periodically to become reified. Fi-
nally, the aforementioned tendencies are exacerbated by the formal character of law
itself in the liberal tradition, that is, its requirement that the grounds of decision in
particular cases be capable of presentation in a general, suprahistorical rule-form. See
note 195 supra. See also Blackburn, A Brief Guide to Bourgeois Ideology, in Sntme.,,r
PowER 163 (A. Cockburn & R. Blackburn eds. 1969); Horton, The Dehumanization of
Anomie and Alienation: A Problem in the Ideology of Sociology, 15 Bnrr. J. Soc. 283
(1964).
277. The leading example of the postwar project of reviving liberal legalism is
the school or current that developed the ideal of reasoned elaboration. The origins and
rise of this jurisprudence are traced in White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 279 (1973). See generally
P. BATOR, P. MisHm, D. SiApmo, & H. WacHSELmR, HART & WECtSLER's Tim FanEaAL
COURS AND Tm FEnEnL SysTi (2d ed. 1973); H. HAnT & A. SACKS, THz LwAL
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reason, it is appropriate to conceive of modern legal consciousness as
a relatively unified whole, although this is a unity that consists
chiefly in a willingness to merge approaches and methods that, if
pushed only slightly, appear to be antagonistic. The preeminent
characteristic of modern legal consciousness, transcending all politi-
cal battlelines, is its unreflective and uncritical quality, its attempt
to accommodate yet obscure the contradictions of legal thought,
which reflect the contradictions of social life in late capitalist society.
IV. CONCLUSION AND POSTSCRIPT
Although certain concrete legal inhibitions were placed on
worker self-activity in the period immediately preceding World War
I, the primary role of the Court was to fashion and articulate a
legitimating ideology for the emerging institutional system governing
the workplace. In the postwar period, while continuing this ideologi-
cal mission, the Court played an enormous role in elaborating the
institutional structure of mature collective bargaining. To a degree
unprecedented in the capitalist world, the judiciary directly and crea-
tively intervened in the workplace and was crucially involved in de-
signing the architecture of the modern, administered, and regulated
system of class relations. It is again an irony that many of the leading
developments in this process were widely perceived as victories for
labor and intrusions upon the prerogatives of management. Many of
the Court's rulings were, in fact, designed to bolster the institutional
interests of labor unions. Often, however, this occurred at undue
expense to the rights of individual employees and to the initiative of
the rank and file. More and more, unions were treated as guarantors
of productivity and enforcers of work-discipline, and the chasm sepa-
rating union leadership from the rank and file was widened. Cases
hailed as prolabor victories may therefore someday be regarded as
long-run defeats for working people, particularly in an industrial
world in which it is debatable whether the institutional interests
of labor unions are entirely congruent with the needs and interests
of working people. 5
PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forward: The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARM. L. REV. 84 (1959). Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also D. Kennedy,
Utopian Rationalism in American Legal Thought (1970) (unpublished manuscript on
file at MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW).
278. Central themes of postwar labor doctrine that will be explored in future
essays include the following:
(a) the Court's chimerical attempt to keep the law out of the substance of collec-
tive bargaining, to separate substance and form in labor law, both as to the substantive
terms of contracts and as to scrutiny of the legitimate economic weapons to be avail-
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In retrospect, it should not be surprising that the attempt to ease
the oppression of working people through legal reform ended by rein-
forcing the institutional bases of that oppression, however much it
improved the material circumstances of organized workers.
In one sense, the problem of law is the same as the problem of
labor. Producing goods and services in the workplace and making law
in legislatures and courtrooms are both forms of objectification-that
process "whereby human subjectivity embodies itself in products
that are available to oneself and one's fellow men as elements of a
common world."1 Because "[mI]an and society exist only as praxis,
outside themselves in the fluctuating interworld their actions com-
pose together,"2 0 objectification is the ontological foundation of
human freedom and self-actualization. But in the capitalist work-
process, objectification takes on the character of alienation: the prod-
able to the parties, see H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins.
Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952);
(b) the exclusion of labor unions from bargaining over managerial decisions
"which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control," Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring);
(c) the enhanced institutional role and responsibilities of labor unions, see Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); Order of R.R. Teleg-
raphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 332 (1944); Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962); Appa-
lachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958); Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 995 (1958);
(d) the steady erosion of the section 7 right to engage in protected, concerted
activity, see note 53 supra;
(e) the gradual metamorphosis of grievance arbitration from a voluntary and
private mode of dispute resolution into a semicompulsory, institutional system for the
management of complex enterprises, resulting in the dilution of statutory rights, see
Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); and
(f) the altered conception of labor unions whereby they are increasingly seen not
as private associations within civil society, but as semigovernmental agencies whose
acts border on "state action," and that therefore may properly be subjected to the
closest regulation, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1955); Western Addition Community
Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting);
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, §§
2-611, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1970).
279. Berger & Pullberg, Reification and the Sociological Critique of
Consciousness, NEw Lm REv., January-February 1966, at 60.
280. Anderson, Problems of Socialist Strategy, in TowARws SocL ALsh 288-89 (P.
Anderson & R. Blackburn eds. 1966).
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uct, commanded and owned by another, is an estranged, alien power,
over and against the producers, who have no way to recall that the
world in which they live has been created by themselves.2"" The capi-
talist work-process, far from being an expression of human freedom,
is a realm of unfreedom, of separation between the self and others,
between consciousness and actuality, a realm in which no person can
recognize him- or herself.
Lawmaking is governed by the same process of alienation. Its
structure and function in liberal capitalism make it, too, a form of
activity in which the "product," moral and allocational rules and
decisions, cannot be recognized as having been created by its pur-
ported authors, the people. Law in our society is made by experts
socialized in elite institutions and distant from the lived reality of
everyday life in capitalist society. Its connection to official violence
and coercion, its impersonal, antiparticipatory character, its insist-
ence on the presentation of all moral judgments in the form of gen-
eral, suprahistorical rules, and its exaltation of property over human
dignity, all make it inevitable that the form of lawmaking must be a
negation of the human spirit, even when the impulse to do justice and
to accommodate to changing social priorities forces its way into the
content of legal decisions.
One cannot expect that work will be emancipated from its alien-
ated character without the abolition of the social relations, including
legal relations, that produce that character. Alienation can only be
transcended through a comprehensive historical metamorphosis of
social and political relationships, a process that would profoundly
transform the quality of legal arrangements, indeed, the very nature
and form of law. Conversely, while legal practice remains a form of
alienation, there can be no fundamental change in the character of
work or any other aspect of social life. Until lawmaking becomes a
quest for justice in each concrete historical setting, until the "rule of
law" ideal (the separation of law and ethics) is abolished and ethics
brought directly into daily life as a continuous, participatory practice
of mediation and redefinition of relations among people who see in
each other the possibility of their own fulfillment, that is, until law-
making becomes a self-conscious, critical form of social practice,2 '
there can be no hope of the emancipation of labor.2 The struggle to
transform lawmaking in this manner is intimately linked to the strug-
281. See Berger & Pullberg, supra note 279, at 61.
282. See A. Fraser, supra note 13.
283. Though this is inevitably a call for the politicization of law, I do not mean
to advocate the complete abolition of the distinction between public and private,
which must continue to exist, generating a creative tension that will lead to the realfir-
mation of the individual in and through community.
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gle to make the workplace a realm of free self-activity and expression.
Labor law reform in the 1930's served as a vehicle for the preservation
of liberal capitalism and the alienated social relationships that con-
stitute it. Henceforth, the struggle to emancipate labor must also be
a struggle to emancipate law itself.

